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Abstract
My dissertation research provides first systematic analysis of women’s early voting
behavior. The key contribution of this thesis is that women’s suffrage made a
significant dent into electoral politics. Such finding provides a direct contradiction
to the so frequent claim that women voted as their husbands for most of the
twentieth century.
The thesis consists of three separate chapters, each addressing a distinct puzzle
in the literature. In the first paper, I argue that, contrary to most of the extant
literature, women contributed to the victory of the Republican Party in the 1920
election outside of the Black Belt. In the second paper, I argue that women in
Protestant countries supported parties that appealed to their welfare and suffrage
preferences in the first election after the vote was won. In the third paper, I
argue that the redistributive effects of women’s suffrage were mediated by women’s
support for parties with redistributive agendas.
The key argument of this thesis is that women tended to vote on their redis-
tributive preferences. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that women supported
conservative parties, I find robust evidence that women’s suffrage mostly benefitted
parties with redistributive agendas. While my research does not seek to challenge
the notion that women held socially conservative preferences, it directly contra-
dicts the notion that women voted on such preferences for conservative parties.
In the Catholic South, women’s support for Christian Democratic parties most
likely reflected women’s preference for Christian Democratic type of the welfare
state, which emphasized family values. In the Protestant North, women supported
Socialist parties for their welfare preferences, particularly once they entered the
workforce. But even at the time of suffrage, women were mainly attracted to par-
ties on the left, responding to both their welfare and suffrage appeals to women.
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1 Introduction: Motivation for this Research and
its Contribution
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and coming to fruition throughout the
twentieth century, the introduction of women into the electorate was one of the
most significant societal changes to occur over the past 150 years. Scholars as well
as contemporary commentators and analysts have always wondered to what extent
women’s suffrage would affect politics. Would women vote? If so, would they vote
as their husbands? Or would they vote on their religious, prohibitionists, moralist
or progressive preferences?
In the research presented here, I seek to re-examine some of the conventional
claims and wisdoms in the literature on women’s voting behavior and its politi-
cal implications. My research provides first systematic analysis of the effects of
women’s suffrage on partisan outcomes. I seek to examine whether women voted
differently than men and if so, which parties women were more likely to support
and to shed light on why women held distinct partisan choices.
The key argument of this thesis is that women voted differently from men
both in the long-run and immediately after suffrage. Moreover, women tended
to support parties with redistributive agendas. Such findings directly contradict
the economic literature which claims that women’s suffrage did not affect partisan
outcomes. It also directly contradicts the political science literature which argues
that women historically supported conservative parties.
The thesis consists of three separate chapters, each addressing a distinct puzzle
in the literature. In the first paper, I argue that, contrary to most of the extant
literature, women contributed to the victory of the Republican Party in the 1920
election outside of the Black Belt. In the second paper, I argue that women in
Protestant countries supported parties that appealed to their welfare and suffrage
preferences in the first election after the vote was won. In the third paper, I
argue that the redistributive effects of women’s suffrage were mediated by women’s
support for parties with redistributive agendas in the long-run.
This chapter consists of the following sections. Section II provides background
information on the timing and causes of women’s suffrage reforms. Section III
summarizes the relevant literature on women’s early voting behavior and identifies
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key limitations of the extant literature and shows how I address these limitations
in this dissertation research. In section IV, I discuss the methodological approach
that underlines my research. In the final section, I summarize the findings of each
chapter and highlight the key contributions of my research.
1.1 Background: The Quest for Women’s Suffrage
1.1.1 The Timeline of Female Suffrage Adoption in the West and the
World.
The admission of women into the voting public was one of the most remarkable
social and political transformations of the last century. While only three countries
extended full voting rights to women prior to 1900, by 2000, in nearly every country
where men could vote, so too could women. Figure 1 summarizes the adoption of
women’s suffrage in 190 countries since 1820.1 To the extent that female suffrage
can be used as a primary indicator of democratization, the graph effectively cap-
tures the rise of democracy throughout the twentieth century. While men in many
Western countries enjoyed some voting rights since the 1850s, women were for-
mally excluded from political matters throughout most of the nineteenth century.
The first country to extend full voting rights to women was New Zealand (1893),
followed by Australia (1901) and Finland (1907). Interestingly, the Pitcairn Is-
lands (1838), the Isle of Man (1881), and the Cook Islands (1893) enfranchised
women prior to New Zealand.
Adopting women’s suffrage prior to the 1900, however, was well ahead of the
time, so to speak. In most cases, women acquired the vote after World War
One in the West and after World War Two in the rest of the world. Until 1950,
only about half of countries enfranchised women on the same terms as men. The
most significant rise in global female suffrage reforms occurred from about 1960s
until 1980s, generally enfranchising women in new, decolonized democracies in
Africa, Latin America and Asia. The last countries to adopt female suffrage at the
federal/national level in the West were Switzerland (1971) and Portugal (1975).
1Female suffrage is defined as a single piece of legislation which enfranchised most women
in national (federal) elections. In the West, these reforms generally enfranchised about 90% of
all adult women and 80% of the adult population, mostly leaving out women and men below
restrictive voting age limits.
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Outside the West, Oman (2003), United Arab Emirates (2006) and Saudi Arabia
(2015) allowed women to the polls only in early 2000s.
Figure 1: The Adoption of Women’s Suffrage in the World 1820-2015.
The focus of this dissertation is limited to Western countries, which enfran-
chised most women in the first half of the twentieth century. Most Western women
were granted the right to vote following World War One (Austria, Canada, Den-
mark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, and United
States) and in few cases after World War Two (Belgium, France, Italy, Malta).
Australia, New Zealand and Norway adopted universal female suffrage prior to
World War One, while Spain and the UK granted women full voting rights in the
interwar period. Countries which allowed women to the polls comparatively late
were Greece (1956), Portugal (1975) and Switzerland (1971).
Figure 2 indicates the adoption of full female suffrage in 23 Western countries
in comparison to universal male suffrage. Clearly, although male franchise reforms
were adopted since the 1850s and generally included rich men before poor men,
most women were enfranchised only after men in all Western countries. By 1900,
only three countries extended voting rights to women, while men enjoyed full vot-
ing rights in about half of all Western countries. As such, women never obtained
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full voting rights before men.2 While male suffrage was generally adopted grad-
ually from propertied men, taxpayers, literate or otherwise privileged men to all
men, most Western women were enfranchised in one fell swoop. Only women in
Iceland, Norway, Ireland and United Kingdom were enfranchised gradually and
the franchise reforms therefore followed a similar pattern that was applied to men,
initially disenfranchising poor and young women. In a similar vein, contrary to
the fact that men in most federal states were enfranchised gradually by states
and provinces, most federal states enfranchised most women in most states with a
single piece of legislation.
Figure 2: The Adoption of Men’s and Women’s Suffrage in the West
1820-2015.
2Only Finland, Luxembourg and Malta granted female and full male suffrage at the same
time, although considerable number of men with property voted in Luxembourg and Malta prior
to these ‘joint’ adoptions.
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1.1.2 Explaining the Timing of Women’s Suffrage Adoption in the
West
The Role of Women’s Movement in Political Emancipation
The adoption of women’s suffrage in the West did not happen so easily. While
women in most countries did not obtain full voting rights until the twentieth
century, the origin of women’s quest for the vote frequently dates back to the
1850s. American women began organizing as early as 1848 at the first women’s
rights convention in Seneca Falls, while the House of Commons in the U.K. voted
on female suffrage as early as 1832. More organized efforts in both countries began
in the 1860s, with membership in national organizations and participation in rallies
increasing significantly just before World War One (Pateman 1994, p. 332).
But the strength and efficacy of suffrage movements varied greatly between
countries. The ‘standard model’ of suffrage marked by prolonged and often mili-
tant, highly organized campaign efforts, such as in the United Kingdom and United
States, was not necessarily applicable to other countries. Perhaps surprisingly, the
first countries which enfranchised women, such as New Zealand and Australia, did
not experience the window breaking, mass rallies and hunger strikes as witnessed
in the United Kingdom or United States (Nolan and Daley 1994, p.2). Indeed,
the suffrage movement in countries such as Australia and New Zealand was effec-
tive after a relatively short period of rather peaceful campaigning. However, it
should not be asserted that women’s efforts were negligible or irrelevant for the
vote in countries with moderate suffrage movements (Pateman 1994, p.332). Calls
for suffrage in New Zealand, for example, can be traced as far back as 1869, with
more pronounced calls after the establishment of the New Zealand branch of the
Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) in 1885.
Interestingly, the link between WCTU and the suffrage movement in New
Zealand is no coincidence and played a significant role in the suffrage movement.
The movement, originating in the U.S., successfully spread its ‘gospel’ to mostly
British colonies, such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia. In these countries,
the quest for female suffrage often emerged from women’s movements for prohibi-
tion, social reforms and abolition. The WCTU established itself as an international
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force in the temperance as well as women’s movements. To the temperance women,
suffrage was a necessary means to the abolition of the saloon and other social re-
forms that sought to ameliorate women’s position in the home (Tyrrell 1991, p.9).
The Limits of Women’s Agency in Political Emancipation
Despite the fact that women’s efforts were clearly relevant for the adoption of
female suffrage, scholars generally point to the limitations of women’s agency in
the quest for their political emancipation. Not surprisingly, the suffrage movement
in many countries that enfranchised women comparatively late was often vigorous,
such as in Switzerland (Nolan and Daly 1994, p.10; Banaszak 1996). Similarly,
calls for women’s suffrage in France were articulated as early as in 1789 and the
first (and the last) mass rally for the cause occurred in 1914 (Offen 1994). It can
hardly be asserted that women’s efforts were sufficient to explain the timing of
suffrage adoptions.
Scholars have thus always wondered which structural factors were relevant for
the success of women’s movements across the world. For a start, many noted
that most of the early enfranchisers were colonial farming societies with a pre-
ponderance of men (Dalziel 1994; Braun and Kvasnicka 2013). For example, the
opponents of female suffrage in France expressed strong fears that women voters
would outnumber men due to significant casualties among men in the Great War
(Offen 1994, p. 162).
But such accounts cannot explain why the proportion of women would play
a significant role. Others have therefore pointed out that the timing of woman’s
suffrage in the societies which enfranchised women early is best explained by a
political culture which is more perceptible to female suffrage. For example, Mc-
Cammon et al (2001) asserts that ‘frontier’ states enfranchised women early for its
unique ‘gendered’ opportunity structures, which altered attitudes of male policy-
makers about the role of women in society.
Yet such ‘gendered’ opportunity structures that are more permissible to suffrage
movement should not be limited to ‘frontier’ states with high sex ratio. Women
were historically legally barred from owning property and forming contracts. They
had circumscribed rights to divorce, access to education and faced a tremendous
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disadvantage in market wages should they choose to work. Only with the rise of
the ‘new woman’, who was educated, economically independent, politically active
in women’s clubs and other organizations and entered a professional career of her
own, could women’s suffrage movement succeed (McCammon et al 2001, DuBois
1975, Przeworski 2009).
Finally, the effect of the World Wars should not be underestimated. Women’s
efforts in both wars were extensive and politicians often vigorously called for their
assistance and help, from targeting women with wheat-saving measures, appealing
to their caring responsibilities for wounded soldiers or encouraging them to assume
work previously done by men in factories and farms. After the war, politicians were
more amendable to women’s suffrage, considering their service on the home front
(Saldin 2010, p.97; McCammon et al 2001). The change in President Wilson’s
position on suffrage after World War One is attributed by some to his acknowl-
edgement of women’s efforts during the war (Saldin 2010, p.80). At the same time,
many speculated that women in counties such as France, U.K., the Netherlands
and Belgium may have been enfranchised long before World War One, had the
war not interrupted women’s quest for the vote (Offen 1994; Przeworski 2009).
The Strategic Incentives of Political Actors in Political Emancipation
While the women’s movement and the role of ‘gendered’ opportunity structures
jointly explain large variation in the timing of suffrage adoptions, neither of the
two explanations consider strategic incentives of politicians and political parties.
Political economists studying the adoptions of male suffrage reforms have been long
aware of the importance of strategic incentives of the elite in the democratization
process (Acemoglu and Robisons 2000; Lizzeri and Persico 2004; Llavador and
Oxoby 2005). If the elite possess the power over franchise, why would it ever
decide to extend the vote and undermine its power? While the women’s movement
never seriously threatened male politicians with revolutions or possessed power to
overthrow current regimes, as it was in the case of male suffrage, women’s suffrage
could only be adopted if male politicians agreed to it. It follows that, to the extent
that politicians believed that women held distinct political preferences, they had
an incentive to enfranchise women only when such reform would benefit them
14
(Bertochci 2011; Przeworski 2009).
Ample examples support the notion that politicians not only expected women
to hold distinct preferences, but that they also believed that women would have
acted upon them. In France, the republican radical senators blocked suffrage re-
forms three times during the interwar period, expressing deep fears that the newly
enfranchised women would vote for a Catholic/right-wing ticket, undermining the
secular republic (Offen 1994, p.160). In the United Kingdom, Liberal Lloyd George
opposed women’s suffrage bill in 1911, expressing fears that conservative women
would ‘spell disaster for Liberalism’ (Blewett 1965). Interestingly, women’s suf-
frage was not only opposed by liberal and radical politicians. For example, women
in New Zealand were expected to support liberal, if not socialist candidates, leaving
many conservatives opposing female suffrage in the fear of losing power (Grimshaw
2013).
But the strategic incentives for politicians did not end with suffrage adoption.
Once women were granted the vote, politicians tried to ‘pander’ to women’s pref-
erences. For example, the adoption of the Sheppard-Towner Act of 1921, which
aimed to reduce maternal and infant mortality in the U.S., is not only attributed
to women’s lobbying efforts, but also to politicians’ fear that failure to act would
be costly at an electoral level (Lemons 1973, p. 157; Skocpol 1992, pp. 497-506).
It is therefore less surprising that voting in the U.S. Congress became more lib-
eral/progressive once women became legitimate part of the electorate (Lott and
Kenny 1999, Miller 2008).
1.2 Related Literature: Women’s Historical Voting Be-
haviour
1.2.1 Does Suffrage Affect Partisan Outcomes?
Whether women’s suffrage was adopted in response to the women’s movement, gen-
dered opportunity structures or strategic calculations of politicians, once women
were given the vote, they rushed to the polls en masse. Surely not all women
turned out in the first election, frequently voting at a lower rate than men, but
their large numbers at the polls could hardly be ignored. To the extent that women
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held distinct political preferences, the introduction of women into the electorate
should alter the power constellation of parties in the parliament.
To what extent and how women’s suffrage affected partisan outcomes, however,
remains contested. While some scholars noted that women voted mostly as their
husbands (Duverger 1955), others pointed out that politicians’ expectations about
women’s voting behaviour were exaggerated and never fully materialised (Andersen
1996, p.153; Freeman 2002, p.2). Moreover, if parties followed ‘Downsian’ logic
and strategically appealed to the new women voters, neither party would benefit
from women’s suffrage (Lott and Kenny 1999, Miller 2008). Instead, according
to this logic, women’s suffrage could affect partisan platforms, public policies and
challenge men’s monopolistic power in the public arena, but may not have affected
electoral outcomes (Andersen 1996, p.3; Clark and Clark 2008, p.2; Duverger 1955;
Lott and Kenny 1999; Miller 2008). Indeed, women’s suffrage was followed by more
liberal/progressive voting in the U.S. Congress (Lott and Kenny 1999; Miller 2008).
In Europe, for example, both Socialist and Christian Democratic parties sought
to attract women’s votes with welfare appeals (Huber and Stephens 2000).
But if instead of a Downsian world, parties respond to the preferences of their
electorate and rarely converge on the median (Grofman 2004), then partisan plat-
forms differ from those of their competitors and women’s suffrage would have the
potential to alter power constellation of parties in national bodies. Ample ev-
idence suggests that while most parties attempted to capture the votes of the
newly enfranchised women, strategically altering their platforms, programmatic
differences between parties were never completely eliminated. For a start, par-
ties in the European multiparty systems frequently adopted very different ideas
about the type of a welfare state and offered very distinct ideas about women’s
role in the society. Depite the fact that Socialists and Christian Democrats clearly
offered better welfare platforms, each proposed very different ideas. Most Social-
ist parties attempted to attract women’s votes with policies that relieved work-
ing women from their traditional caregiving responsibilities, such as state funded
childcare while Christian Democratic parties frequently supported families with
substantial tax, wage and benefit systems, incentivizing women to stay outside of
paid employment (Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 1993; Huber and
Stephens 2000; Van Kersbergen 1991; Wilensky 1990). But partisan differences
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were not unique to multiparty systems. Even in the two party systems, partisan
platforms differed substantially on matters important to women. For example, the
Republican Party was historically more supportive of prohibition, marginally more
supportive of women’s suffrage and appealed to women’s progressive preferences
after they have been enfranchised (Bagby 1960; Lemons 1973, p. 87), in each case
better addressing women’s preferences at the time.
This thesis relies on the assumption that while parties are strategic actors
and attempt to alter their programmatic preferences to capture women’s votes,
systematic differences between political platforms were never completely erased.
To the extent that women held distinct preferences, this dissertation argues that
parties which better represented women’s interest should benefit from the reforms.
1.2.2 Which Political Parties Benefitted from Women’s Suffrage?
There are both theoretical and empirical reasons that support the key argument of
this dissertation that male and female voters held distinct preferences for political
parties, and that women’s enfranchisement affected electoral outcomes. Examining
the current political, historical, economic and sociological literature, I formulate
three theses which stipulate women’s voting behavior in history.
Traditional Voting Gap Thesis
The traditional voting gap thesis attributes conservative values to women, mainly
stemming from their roles as mothers, homemakers, and churchgoers.3 These
social roles, which gave women power in a ‘separate sphere’ from (male) public
sphere, were often seen as enhancing women’s moral superiority vis-a-vis men, and
would have driven women to vote based on their moralistic or religious approach
to sexuality and family (DuBois 1975; Goldstein 1973; Norris 1988; Randall 1981;
Skocpol 1992; Tingsten 1937). In fact, the ‘developmental theory of the gender
gap’ theorizes such ‘conventional wisdoms.’ Utilizing survey data from the 1950s,
its authors argue that in the time of low female labor force and higher educa-
tion attainment of women, women hold socially conservative values (Inglehart and
3Women’s role as mothers and their right to vote as mothers has been frequently emphasized
by the suffrage movement. For a cartoon example, see Appendix Figure 1.
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Norris 2000).
This line of research often points to women’s support for Catholic policies of
Christian Democrats in the South, Conservative parties in the Protestant North
and parties which supported temperance measures in the U.S. and the British
colonies (Duverger 1955; Norris 1988; Randall 1987; Tingsten 1937; Tyrrell 1991).
In the U.S., most contemporary explanations repeatedly stress women’s prohi-
bitionist and socially conservative preferences as a possible channel for women’s
Republican preferences (Tingsten 1937; Duverger 1955; Ogburn and Goltra 1919).
In Canada, the Liberals tended to oppose suffrage in some provinces, fearing that
women would support prohibition.4 Similarly, in New Zealand, the commonly held
perception after the first election under universal suffrage was that women were
responsible for the election of the candidates that were more supportive of, among
other issues, temperance (Grimshaw 2013).
In Europe, liberal politicians were often against female suffrage on the grounds
that women suffrage would increase the conservative vote (Przeworski 2009). More-
over, ample anecdotal evidence suggests that Christian Democratic parties suc-
cessfully captured women’s votes in Catholic countries. Summarizing the limited
polling data tallied separately by sex, Duverger (1955) and Tingsten (1937) finds
that whenever there were substantial differences between male and female voting
patterns, women tended to be more conservative than men. For example in Ger-
many, Catholic Zentrum/CDU received 8-9% more votes from women in both 1920
and 1953 election, while the difference was 15-20% in the most Catholic districts.
The post-war survey data in Italy and Belgium also documented a traditionally
sex-distinctive base of Christian Democrats, often attracting as many as 20% more
women, particularly in the most Catholic districts (Barnes 1974; Hill 1974; Van
Kersbergen 1991).
Distributive Politics Thesis
However, the conventional wisdom that women held conservative preferences is not
4For example, Ontario’s premier Arthur C. Hardy was frequently depicted in cartoons as
prohibiting women to the polls given that his ‘friends in the trade would not like it.’ (Evening
Telegram 13 January 1898; Canada), see Appendix Figure 2.
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the only channel that can determine women’s partisan preferences. In fact, many
argue that women held progressive and welfare preferences throughout most of the
twentieth century.5 Even within classes, women are generally more economically
vulnerable than men. Under the fairest economic and legal conditions women
are more likely than men to take time away from the labor market in order to
bear and raise children, which decreases their lifetime earnings relative to men
even when they have considerable labor market power. In the era of women’s
enfranchisement, the economic vulnerability of women was even more pronounced
than it is today. Working women faced an even greater wage gap than exists today
(Goldin 1994), and often did not have the right to keep their property when they
entered marriage, or to determine the use of their wages (Skocpol 1992; Tilly and
Scott 1987).
For these reasons, the suffragists frequently argued that women needed the vote
to ameliorate their situation in the home and their communities, often calling for
the state to intervene (Burrell 2000, p.6; Skocpol 1992; Tyrrell 1991). In the U.K.,
the National Union for Women’s Suffrage sponsored pamphlets which frequently
argued that women’s suffrage was essential for improving the economic position of
working women (Garner 1984; p.14).6 It was argued that without the vote, trade
unions could not represent interests of the working women. In the first eletion
where women were granted full voting rights, the U.K. Labour party called for
women’s votes ‘for the sake of children’.7 In New Zealand, women’s suffrage may
have helped the Liberal Party, which was, among other things, more supportive
of labor policies (Grimshaw 2013). In the U.S., the Progressive Party is said to
have enjoyed substantial support among women, at least until its members re-
joined the Republican camp (Goldstein 1973, p. 138; Gustafson 2001, p. 116).
The progressive activism of the American women in the first half of the twentieth
century has been placed by many at the heart of the Progressive era (Andersen
1996; pp. 153–159; Skocpol 1992, pp. 56, 354; Dye 1991, pp. 1-9). In Protestant
Europe, many argued that the newly mobilized women gradually aligned with
Socialist parties. In the absence of generous family policies that were common in
5See Appendix Figures 3 & 4 for cartoons in which women are attributed progressive prefer-
ences.
6See Appendix Figure 6.
7See Appendix Figure 5.
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the Catholic countries, women needed to seek paid employment. Once employed,
they developed positive attitudes towards better health, education and welfare
services, as well as seek relief from their caregiving responsibilities from the state
(Huber and Stephens 2000; Wilensky 1990).
In a similar vein, the political economists have long argued that women’s eco-
nomically vulnerable position leads them to support redistributive policies (Edlund
and Pande 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth 2006; Lott and Kenny 1999). Indeed,
vast amount of literature documents that the expansion of public budgets in the
West was related to the adoption of women’s suffrage (Aidt et al 2006; Bertoc-
chi 2011; Carruthers and Wanamaker 2015; Lindert 1994; Lott and Kenny 1999;
Miller 2008). According to this thesis, to the extent that parties adopted different
programmatic positions on progressive and redistributive policies, women’s enfran-
chisement should have translated into more support for parties with redistributive
and progressive platforms. It follows that women may have aligned with parties
with redistributive agendas long before the cultural and structural changes that
brought women to the left in the 1980s (Inglehart and Norris 2000).
Electoral Co-Optation Thesis
There is, finally, a third possibility in which women’s preferences are determined
not by ex-ante economic or social allegiances, but by the very politics of franchise
reform. Here, a wedge is driven between a strict left-versus-right hypothesis be-
cause female voters will display loyalty for the party that was in power when the
reform was extended or that was historically seen as more supportive of women’s
suffrage.
In many countries, the final vote to enfranchise women often received broad-
based support. For example, neither major party in the U.S. adopted suffrage
on its platform until both did in 1916 (Banaszak 1996). Subsequently, both the
Democratic and Republican parties attempted to use the ‘suffrage’ card to attract
women’s votes in the first election under universal suffrage (Andersen 1996).8 In
8The Progressive party, however, fiercely proposed women’s suffrage long before both
Democrats and Republicans adopted suffrage on their platforms. Appendix Figure 4 shows
a cartoon which attributes women progressive platforms and, in turn, the Progressive party is
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Canada, the conservative party in Ontario only enfranchised women once the Lib-
eral Party made a promise to women, hoping to win thankful women’s votes (Bac-
chi 1983, p.138). This suggests that as political tides shifted, strategic parties may
have clamored to be seen as the party responsible for the extension, hoping to win
women’s votes as a show of loyalty.
But politician’s effort to enfranchise women in order to play the ‘suffrage’ card
in the following election may not have worked. For example, while the Conser-
vatives passed the second reform act in Britain, which extended suffrage to some
working-class men, hoping to bring the new ‘thankful’ voters into the conservative
camp, neither party benefitted from the reform (Berlinski and Dewan 2010). In
the case of women’s suffrage, women may have remembered which party provided
long term support for suffrage and reward such parties instead. For example,
while the Republican Party showed a somewhat warmer reception to women’s suf-
frage (Lemons 1973, p.87), the Nineteenth Amendment passed under a Democratic
presidency. In Canada, while Liberals passed women’s suffrage at the provincial
level in seven out of nine provinces, it was the Conservative government which
enfranchised women (Cleverdon 1950, p.15). Indeed, analyzing post-war survey
data, Bashevkin (1983) argues that Canadian women socialized during the suf-
frage campaign supported parties which were associated with long-term support
of parties with suffrage agendas.
1.2.3 Limitations of Existing Literature and Rationale for this Disser-
tation Project
This dissertation project seeks to contribute to the existing literature on several
accounts. First and foremost, the time period when most women were enfranchised
in the West is often neglected by political scientists. As most survey data is only
available from the 1950s onwards, the existing evidence on women’s historical
behavior prior to the 1950s is scarce and mostly relies on anecdotal evidence or
limited polling data which tallied votes separately by sex. As such, the only way
to make quantitative inferences about women’s voting behavior at the time of
suffrage is with aggregate electoral data. The methodological challenges of such
willing to accept women into the electorate.
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approaches often contribute to the limited attention of political scientist to the
issue. In this project, I therefore seek to provide first systematic examination of
women’s early voting behavior. Such examination is relevant for three reasons.
First, examining women’s voting behavior after suffrage allows me to connect
women’s voting behavior to the suffrage movement, answering questions unique to
the relevant time period, such as to what extent women’s suffrage movement made
a dent into the established partisan politics? Failing to examine such questions,
both immediately after the reforms and in the long-run, may misrepresent the
mechanism responsible for the redistribution effects of suffrage. If public spending
increased in response to women’s suffrage, it is essential to determine whether such
effects were mediated by parties with redistributive agendas. In this research, I
therefore explore whether parties with reditributive agendas benefitted from the
reforms.
Second, the lack of substantial evidential support for women’s historical voting
behavior often gives rise to multiple contradictions in the literature and leaves
a number of questions unanswered. This dissertation project therefore seeks to
resolve the apparent contradictions in the extant literature: did women vote for
conservative or progressive parties? And if women supported parties with re-
distributive agendas, were such effects immediate or did they develop over time,
conditional on factors such as the female labor force? Did the partisan position of
women’s suffrage matter to women? And if so, did women reward parties which
passed the reforms or did they support parties which provided long-term support
for suffrage?
Finally, while it is challenging to answer the question of ‘why’ women supported
the parties that they did, the comparative character of this dissertation project
makes an effort to do exactly that. Often, parties that supported suffrage were
also parties which supported other issues that were relevant to women, making it
empirically challenging to determine the extent women’s loyalties mattered to their
vote choice outside of a comparative context. For example, the newly enfranchised
women in New Zealand might have supported the Liberal Party as an expression
of their gratitude for suffrage or for liberal’s support for prohibition or for liberals’
economic agendas. Such a strong ‘merging’ of issues, however, was not the case
in all countries. In a comparative context, it may therefore be possible to trace
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whether women were more likely to support parties with redistributive, socially
conservative or pro-suffrage agendas.
1.3 Data & Methodology: Estimating the Effects of Suf-
frage on Political Outcomes
To the extent that women held distinct preferences, women’s suffrage should make
a dent into partisan politics immediately after suffrage and such effects should per-
sist over time. There are, however, reasons to believe that the effects of women’s
suffrage may have only emerged in the long-run. First of all, women may have
developed redistributive preferences only once they entered the workforce. Alter-
natively, if women’s turnout significantly lags behind that of men, women’s suffrage
might have made a significant dent in partisan politics only once a sufficient pro-
portion of women were mobilized. Therefore, in this dissertation, I first explore
the immediate effects of women’s suffrage. I then explore the long-term effects of
suffrage and whether they were conditional on other factors, such as women’s labor
force or women’s turnout. To this end, I apply two methodological approaches.
1.3.1 Estimating Short-Term Effects of Female Suffrage
In the first two parts of this thesis, I seek to estimate an immediate effect of
suffrage on partisan outcomes using several within-country case studies. Using a
smaller sample of countries, this approach allows me to provide in-depth analysis
of several cases to complement the more general findings from the cross-sectional
analysis.
To this end, I apply a difference in difference method which exploits the vari-
ation in the intensity of suffrage reform across locales and estimates the effect of
women’s vote on partisan outcomes within countries. While female suffrage was
generally adopted nationally, and mostly affected all of a country’s electoral dis-
tricts, because the proportion of women often varied geographically, some localities
were affected by the reforms more than others.9 The idea behind this estimation
9This difference in difference method is now a well-established strategy used in uncovering the
effects of suffrage on electoral, political and policy outcomes (Berlinski and Dewan 2011; Kroth,
Larcinese and Wehrner 2015; Larcinese 2014; Vernby 2013).
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strategy is that locales with higher suffrage exposure should witness a larger in-
crease in support for specific parties. Simply put, if giving the vote to women
mattered for electoral outcomes, the results should be more pronounced in locales
with more women. While the proportion of women across locales generally does
not vary much today, the sex ratio has varied significantly throughout history.
The immediate methodological advantage of this approach is that it allows me
to derive more precise estimates of suffrage on partisan outcomes. The fixed effects
strategy embedded in the difference in difference specification captures confounders
which arise if the intensity of suffrage varies with district characteristics. In other
words, this identification allows me to eliminate any concerns that my results
are biased and inconsistent due to the fact that proportion of women varies with
factors that also affect political outcomes. Moreover, by exploiting the variation
in the strength of suffrage within one country where the reform was imposed on
all geographical units by the government, I can eliminate any concerns that the
treatment effects suffer from selection bias that threatens many attempts which
exploit cross-country variation.
This identification strategy, however, raises two main threats to causal in-
ference. First, district characteristics may be correlated with trends in partisan
support. This would happen if, for example, parties that represented women’s
preferences were already gaining momentum in districts with more women. In
tackling this possibility, I apply a series of placebo tests to examine pre-existing
trends in localities with larger intensity of suffrage. Second, my results might be
driven by men’s rather than women’s behavior. Previous research has shown that
dominant groups might mobilize at higher levels to ‘negate’ the voting power of
the newly enfranchised oppressed groups (Washington 2006). If men mobilized at
higher levels in localities with higher proportion of women, my results would be
driven by men’s rather than women’s voting behavior. In tackling this possibility,
I use data from localities which tallied votes separately by sex, such as in Chicago
and Norway, and show that men did not mobilize at higher levels in the localities
with higher proportion of women.
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1.3.2 Estimating Long-Term Effects of Female Suffrage
In the third part of the thesis, I exploit the rich spatial and temporal variation
in the timing of women’s suffrage and apply a fixed effects model. Analyzing
time-series cross-sectional data of sixteen countries from 1890 to 1975, I provide
descriptive estimates of the long-term effect of women’s suffrage on the support of
parties with redistributive agendas.
Given the wide availability of electoral data at the national level, this ap-
proach allows me to include almost all Western democracies and make general
cross-country comparisons in the long-run. The immediate methodological advan-
tage of this approach is that the fixed effects strategy allows me to remove unob-
served country effects that are constant over time and unobserved common shocks
to partisan support in all countries. To the extent that the timing of women’s
suffrage was exogenous to partisan support, this specification approximates a nat-
ural experiment that seeks to estimate a causal relationship between suffrage and
partisan outcomes. If, on the other hand, the adoption of suffrage reforms was
not exogenous, this specification could return biased and inconsistent estimates.
For example, if the decision to extend franchise was more likely in countries where
support for certain parties grew more rapidly, it would be impossible to estimate
causal relationship with certainty. In the case of women’s suffrage in the West,
these concerns may be of lesser impact, as most reforms were adopted after the
shock of the World Wars.
1.4 Organization and Summary Findings
This dissertation project is organized into three separate papers. In this section,
I summarize the aims, contributions and limitations of each paper.
In the opening paper, titled ‘Votes for and by Women: How Did Women
Vote after the Nineteenth Amendment?’, I estimate the immediate effect of women
suffrage in the case of the United States. While the general narrative in the early
twentieth century associated women with the Republican Party, the idea that
women voted as a block prior to the 1950s has been frequently dismissed. Scholars
frequently called the reform a ‘failure,’ pointing to its subtle presumed effects on
partisan politics or low voter turnout among women.
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In this paper, I provide the first systematic evidence for the contemporary nar-
rative that the Nineteenth Amendment affected partisan outcomes. Specifically,
I show that counties with more women witnessed a larger increase in Republican
support. However, I also find that this effect is conditional on the proportion of
blacks in the county, with counties in the Black Belt showing no effect. Much of
Southern politics revolved around racial issues, with Southern Democrats uphold-
ing white supremacy by disenfranchising most of the black population. I argue
that in counties with high black population, the cost of any Republican gains and
the threat to white supremacy was at its highest. Contrary to the rest of the coun-
try, white Southern women in the Black Belt were incentivized to defend white
supremacy.
While this research provides first systematic evidence for the contemporary
narratives which linked women to the Republican Party and Democrats in the
South, this research cannot answer the question of why most women voted for the
Republican Party. The Republican Party at the time of the reforms made progres-
sive appeals to women, and had a historically warmer reception towards women,
particularly with respect to prohibition and suffrage. It is therefore difficult to
adjudicate between the three theses using the case of the U.S.
In the second paper, titled ‘After the Vote: Programmatic Preferences and
Loyalty’, and co-authored with Dawn Teele, I therefore attempt to differentiate
between the various theses which stipulate women’s voting behavior after suffrage.
By extending the scope of this analysis to additional countries such as Norway,
United Kingdom and Canada, we can better address the reasons behind women’s
partisan preferences. In contrast to the U.S. case, particular political parties in
these countries either represented women’s religious or otherwise socially conser-
vative preferences or better addressed women’s welfare preferences.
In this paper, we argue that women in the three Protestant Western countries
supported parties with redistributive agendas immediately after suffrage. It fol-
lows that such effects were not necessarily conditional on women’s labor force or
women’s voter turnout. In each case, parties which made welfare appeals to women
effectively captured women’s votes. In contrast, parties with conservative agendas
never benefitted from the reforms. We also find that parties with redistributive
agendas were often pioneers of women’s suffrage and may have therefore benefit-
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ted from votes of ‘thankful’ women. Contrary to the previous accounts, however,
parties which were in power when women were enfranchised never benefitted from
suffrage.
In the third and final paper, titled ‘Universal Suffrage and the Electoral Sup-
port for Parties with Redistributive Agenda: Evidence from Sixteen Countries’, I
examine the long-term effects of suffrage on partisan support. While ample empir-
ical evidence documents the link between suffrage and redistribution for both male
and female reforms, the channels of such effects are less clear. In this paper, I show
that parties with redistributive agendas benefitted from the reforms and may have
thus been responsible for the redistributive effects of women’s suffrage. Which re-
distributive parties benefitted from suffrage, however, depends on Catholicism and
female labor force. In Catholic countries, Socialist support was reduced in favor of
the Christian Democrats, particularly when the proportion of women in the paid
workforce was low. I argue that, conveniently for women, family-friendly policies
of the Christian Democrats attracted not only women’s welfare preferences, but
also their socially conservative and religious preferences. In Protestant countries,
however, female suffrage boosted Socialist support, particularly when the female
labor force was at its highest. In this case, I argue that in the absence of Chris-
tian Democratic parties, women had to choose between their welfare and socially
conservative, religious preferences, favoring the former whenever enough women
entered paid employment.
1.4.1 Broader Contribution of This Research
My dissertation research provides the first systematic analysis of women’s early
voting behavior. The key contribution of this thesis is that women’s suffrage made
a significant dent into electoral politics. Such finding provide a direct contradiction
to the so frequent claim that women voted as their husbands for most of the twen-
tieth century. Moreover, it contradicts the economic literature which argues that
women’s suffrage increased redistribution, but did not affect the power constella-
tion of parties in the national bodies. Instead, this dissertation provides evidence
that women’s votes mattered and that not all parties benefitted equally from the
reforms.
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The key argument of this thesis is that not only did women vote differently from
men, but that they tended to vote on their redistributive preferences. Contrary to
the conventional wisdom that women supported conservative parties, I find robust
evidence that women’s suffrage mostly benefitted parties with redistributive agen-
das. My research does not seek to challenge the notion that women held socially
conservative preferences. History provides ample evidence for the importance of
women as mothers and wives, women’s religious and moral values and women’s
emphasis on family and care for children. My research, however, directly contra-
dicts the notion that women voted on such preferences for conservative parties.
In the Catholic South, women’s support for Christian Democratic parties most
likely reflected women’s preference for Christian Democratic type of the welfare
state, which emphasized family values. In the Protestant North, women supported
Socialist parties for their welfare preferences, particularly once they entered the
workforce. But even at the time of suffrage, women were mainly attracted to par-
ties on the left, responding to both their welfare and suffrage appeals to women.
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2 Votes for and by Women: How Did Women
Vote after the Nineteenth Amendment?
Abstract
While scholars always wondered to what extent women’s votes contributed
to the Republican landslide in the 1920 election, the existing evidence is
mixed. This paper exploits variation in the proportion of women across
counties and employs a difference in difference strategy to examine how
women voted in the 1920 Congressional elections. It shows that counties
with more women witnessed a larger increase in Republican strength. This
effect is conditional on the proportion of blacks in the county, with counties
in the Black Belt showing no effect. These findings provide supportive evi-
dence for the contemporary narratives that women historically supported
the Republican Party, while Southern women helped to maintain white
dominance in the region. The paper runs a series of placebo regressions
and shows that the partisan effect of female suffrage is not driven by pre-
existing trends correlated with the proportion of women.
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‘Women oppose prohibition, are in favour of education (presumably
because of their love of children), vote morally (referring in a vague
way to their attitude toward prostitution) and voted for Wilson rather
than Hughes (because the West voted for Wilson, and in the West
women vote).’ (Ogburn and Goltra, 1919)
2.1 Introduction and Overview
On August 18, 1920 Tennessee ratified the Nineteenth Amendment, which guar-
anteed voting rights to all women in all states and in all elections in the process.
It was the last state necessary for the ratification process to be complete. In the
elections on November 2, 1920, women in most states voted for the first time to
Congress. The election ended in an historical landslide for the Republican Party
and produced larger swings in the electorate than the 1896 contest. The war
allowed the pro-business Warren G. Harding to unite the progressive and pro-
business factions in the Republican Party in the face of resentment towards the
Democratic incumbency. While most attribute the Democrats downfall to a public
call for change after the war (Bagby 1962, pp.1922, 150, 157; Hicks 1960, pp.245;
Kleppner 1987, pp.144154; Saldin 2010, pp.927), scholars have always wondered to
what extent the Nineteenth Amendment may have contributed to the Republican
victory in 1920.
The general narrative in the early twentieth century associated women with
the Republican Party. Contemporary politicians, commentators and analysts ex-
pected women to vote Republican or reported anecdotal evidence that women
registered as Republicans (Ogburn and Goltra 1919; Tingsten 1937; Willey and
Rice 1924). Polling data recorded by sex showed that women in Illinois were more
supportive of Harding than Cox (Goldstein 1973). While survey data documented
a substantial gender voting gap after World War Two (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef,
and Lin 2004; Edlund and Pande 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2000), the idea that
women voted as a block prior to the 1950s has been frequently dismissed. This is
mostly on the grounds that women voted as their husbands did, that sex was not
as divisive as religion or class, that the observed differences rarely exceeded few
percentage points and that partisan platforms did not differ much on matters that
were important for women (Alpern and Baum 1985; Clart and Clark 2008, p.2;
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Duverger 1955, p.122; Freeman 2002, p.2; Manza and Brooks 1998; Skocpol 1992,
pp.505-6).
However, there are theoretical reasons to believe that, historically, women sup-
ported the Republican Party more than men. The developmental thesis argues
that women historically supported conservative parties, changing their values only
with long-term cultural and structural changes in the last quarter of the twentieth
century (Inglehart and Norris 2000). In particular, women’s religiosity, morality
and traditional role at the heart of the family may have been responsible for their
historical alliance to the Republican Party (Tingsten 1937; Duverger 1955; Ogburn
and Goltra 1919; Randall 1987; Norris 1988). Women were also overwhelmingly
supportive of dry policies (Tingsten 1937); the link between religion, morality
and prohibition never really evaporated (Kleppner 1987, pp.205-7). Some even
speculated that Cox’s ‘wet’ reputation might have contributed to women voting
Republican in the 1920 elections (Bagby 1960, p.151).
Women’s socially conservative preferences, however, might not be the only
channel that can explain their Republican tendencies. Some scholars argue that
women valued progressive policies long before their realignment to the Democratic
Party in the last quarter of the twentieth century. Indeed, there is ample evidence
to suggest that the expansion of public budgets in the U.S. has been significantly
aided by the adoption of female suffrage (Carruthers and Wanamaker 2015; Miller
2008; Lott and Kenny 1999). In the 1920 election, Harding’s pro-business orien-
tation could hardly be considered progressive, yet the former progressives stayed
with the Party and Harding’s broad social programs would surely have impressed
most progressive women (Bagby 1962, p.149; Freeman 2002, p.24; Gustafson 2001,
p.191; Lemons 1973, pp.87-9).
Neither the developmental theory nor the economic thesis consider the spe-
cific context of the South. Much of Southern politics revolved around racial is-
sues, with Southern Democrats upholding white supremacy by disenfranchising
most of the black population (Besley, Persson and Sturm 2010; Keyssar 2000,
pp.303-368; Kleppner 1987, pp.163-178). While white women in the South sup-
ported white supremacy, (Schuyler 2006, pp.185187; Sims 1997, p.189), Democratic
politicians in the region were afraid that women would not support their partisan
machines. Republican candidates, in turn, saw women’s votes as a great oppor-
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tunity (Schuyler 2006, pp.8596). Indeed, the Republican Party made significant
gains in the region in the 1920 election, although changes in the Black Belt, which
stretched from Eastern Texas to Virginia and Maryland, were minimal. In coun-
ties with high black population, the cost of any Republican gains and the threat
to white supremacy was at its highest. Contrary to the rest of the country, white
Southern women in the Black Belt were incentivized to defend white supremacy.
Quantitative analyses of women’s historical voting behavior are scarce. More-
over, the existing analyses of the 1920 election generally focus on presidential
elections and exclude most, if not all, Southern states (Alpern and Baum 1985;
Corder and Wolbrecht 2011). It follows that no study has, as yet, systematically
examined electoral data from all states affected by the Nineteenth Amendment
in Congressional elections. This is important as the Republican Party made sig-
nificant gains throughout the newly enfranchised states, while the changes were
minimal in the Black Belt. Moreover, women were generally assumed to have
weaker partisan loyalties, which may have allowed them to split their tickets be-
tween presidential and congressional candidates (Goldstein 1973, pp.76, 134-138,
Schuyler 2006, p.85).
In this paper I provide evidence for the contemporary narrative that associ-
ated women with the Republican Party. Moreover, I find that the national pro-
Republican trend among women was reversed in the Black Belt, where women
supported Democratic candidates as much as white men. These findings are com-
patible with the explanation that women aligned with the party that best repre-
sented their preferences, whether it be supremacist preferences in the Black Belt
or progressive and prohibitionist tendencies in the rest of the newly enfranchised
states. Women in most parts of the country voted distinctly from men and, as
such, contributed to the Republican landslide in the 1920 election.
Empirically, I estimate women’s voting behavior by analyzing the U.S. House
elections in the states where women voted for the first time to Congress in 1920.
In a time before large-scale and reliable survey data, the aggregate electoral data
offer the only possibility to examine how women voted in the 1920 elections. It is
necessary to isolate the effect of suffrage from other possible confounding factors.
For example, if suffrage is adopted in localities which also exhibit socio-economic
characteristics that determine partisan outcomes, it is difficult to confidently link
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partisan outcomes to the reforms. My estimation strategy goes a long way towards
tackling this issue. I exploit a variation in the strength of suffrage within a single
country where the reform was imposed on all states by a federal Amendment.
In particular, I compare counties which received a higher ‘dosage’ of treatment
to those with a lower treatment exposure. To this end, I exploit the variation
in the proportion of eligible women across all counties in the sample of the newly
enfranchised states. The idea is that counties with more women were more exposed
to the treatment; therefore, they should have seen a larger increase in Republican
support. This strategy thus allows me to eliminate any concerns that the treatment
effects suffer from the selection bias that often halts cross-sectional studies. The
idea of using the ‘dosage’ of suffrage in examining its effects on political outcomes
was first applied by Berlinski and Dewan (2011). This technique is now frequently
used to estimate the effects of suffrage on both political and economic outcomes
(Carruthers and Wanamaker 2014; Kroth, Larcinese and Wehrner 2015; Larcinese
2014; Vernby 2013).
This empirical strategy, however, could still return biased and inconsistent es-
timates if Republican support was trending differently in counties with different
treatment exposures, for example, if there were more eligible women in 1920 in
counties which also witnessed faster growth in Republican support. To tackle this
possibility I employ two strategies. First, I included a number of socio-economic
controls at their pre-suffrage levels, their change over the five years prior to suf-
frage and district specific shocks. Second, I ran a series of placebo tests confirming
the validity of the parallel trend assumption prior to the enfranchisement. This
means that counties with more eligible women in 1920 did not witness any trend
in partisan outcomes prior to the reform. As part of robustness checks, I provide
evidence that the effect was not driven by registration and other restrictive re-
quirements such as poll taxes and literacy tests. Finally, analyzing electoral data
from Chicago where authorities kept polling records by sex, I provide supportive
evidence that the effect was not driven by higher mobilization of either Republican
men or Republican women.
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2.2 Background: The 1920 Election
At the turn of the century, partisan support displayed significant regional pat-
terns. The Democratic Party controlled the South by disenfranchising most of the
black population using both restrictive, formal and informal measures, effectively
diminishing political competition and voter turnout in most of the region (Besley,
Persson and Sturm 2010; Keyssar 2000, pp.303-368; Kleppner 1987, pp.163-178).
The Republican Party, in turn, enjoyed a lead above 20% in around one-third of
counties outside the South (Kleppner 1987, pp.34-42). This alignment generally
produced a moderate Republican majority at the national level (Sundquist 1973,
p.166). After a period of Democratic upheaval under President Wilson, the Re-
publican Party regained some control by the 1918 election, achieving full control
in the 1920 elections (Kleppner 1987, p.141). The scale of the Republican vic-
tory in 1920, however, exceeded contemporary expectations (Bagby 1962, p.158).
The elections produced larger swings in the electorate than the realignment of
1896 (Saldin 2010, p.83). The Republican Party increased its share of the vote in
the presidential elections by approximately 14%, capturing the presidency, gaining
sixty-three seats in the House and eleven in the Senate. Even the solid Democratic
control of the South was challenged by Republican gains in the region, particularly
in the Upper South.
The landslide of the Republican Party victory in 1920 is attributed by many
to a public call for change after the war (Hicks 1960, pp.245; Kleppner 1987,
pp.144-154; Saldin 2010, pp.92-7). The war allowed the pro-business Warren G.
Harding to unite the Republicans in the face of general resentment of the Demo-
cratic incumbency. Wilson’s engagement in the war, together with his unsuccessful
campaign for the League of Nations, extensive war-time regulatory measures and
the poor post-war economy became too unpopular with the public (Bagby 1962,
pp.19-22, 150, 157; Kleppner 1987, pp.144-154; Saldin 2010, pp.92-7). The ap-
parent antipathy to Wilson’s administration forced Cox to distance himself from
his predecessor, whilst defending Wilson’s international efforts. He never recap-
tured the votes of German, Italian and Irish Americans and women that Wilson’s
administration alienated during the war (Bagby 1962, pp.141-146, 152-155).
The issues that were relevant in the 1920 election, however, went beyond dis-
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agreements over Wilson’s administration. The two main parties differed on sev-
eral issues that were thought to be relevant to the new women voters. For a
start, although the war shifted both parties to the right and marked an end to the
Progressive Era (Bagby 1962, pp.161-167, Gould 2001, p.80), neither party could
entirely ignore the progressive movement. While Harding’s nomination meant a
victory for the pro-business wing over the progressives in the Republican Party,
former progressives stayed with the party. The differences between the two presi-
dential candidates were not large enough to warrant them supporting Cox, it was
the Southern fraction of the Democratic Party, seen as the main reactionary force,
that needed to be checked. Cox, while slightly less conservative, was thus a candi-
date of both the South and the reactionaries (Bagby 1962, pp.146-150). Moreover,
Harding successfully appeased the urban progressive wing in the Republican Party
and women with broad social programs (Lemons 1973, pp.87-9; Gustafson 2001,
p.191; Bagby 1962, p.149).
Second, the anti-slavery legacy of the Republican Party attracted black vot-
ers, particularly in the face of Cox’s blatant racism and the segregationist faction
of his party. The Republicans worked hard to register newly enfranchised black
women in Border States and once again relied on their votes in the North (Bagby
1962, p.152). Third, although the old associations between prohibition and the Re-
publicans became less divisive by 1920, it never completely evaporated (Kleppner
1987, pp.205-207). Some even speculated that Cox’s ‘wet’ reputation and Hard-
ing’s calculated ‘dry’ appeal to women might have contributed to women voting
Republican in the 1920 elections (Bagby 1960, p. 151).
The anti-slavery and prohibition movements partially gave rise to the suffrage
movement (Freeman 2002, p.42; Kleppner 1987, p.172; Saldin 2010, p.79). Of the
two major parties, the Republican Party was considered marginally more support-
ive of female suffrage and more favorable to women; most early suffragists were
publicly supporting the Republican Party (Banaszak 1996, pp.110–112; Freeman
2002, p.24; Gustafson 2001, p.194). The Nineteenth Amendment was passed in
a Republican Congress; a vast majority of the ratifying states were Republican
controlled (Lemons 1973, p.87). The fiercest opposition, in turn, came from the
Southern Democrats (Banaszak 1996, pp.110-112; Freeman 2002, p.50; Schuyler
2006, p.26). Both Democrats and Republicans, however, failed to show serious
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efforts to enfranchise women before the war (Andersen 1996, p.77), only lobbying
for their support before the 1920 election (Bagby 1962, p.152; Gustafson 2001,
p.194; Lemons 1973, p.87). Some even interpreted Wilson’s turn from a reluctant
to vehement supporter of suffrage as a strategic calculation to capture women’s
votes (Link 1954, p.60; Lunardi and Knock 1980).
2.3 Related Literature and Contribution
Scholars have always wondered to what extent women contributed to the victory
of the Republican Party in 1920. Ample historical evidence shows that contempo-
rary politicians, commentators and analysts associated women with the Republican
Party. The newspapers frequently expected women to align with the Republicans
and reported anecdotal evidence that women voted or registered as Republicans.1
For example, just after the 1920 election, the New York Times headline claimed
‘Mrs. Livermore attributes half of the Republican Majority to Women’s Efforts’,
quoting the head of the Women’s Republican Committee of New York State. The
earliest studies often concluded that the early women voters leaned to the Republi-
can Party (Ogburn and Goltra 1919; Tingsten 1937; Willey and Rice 1924). Most
importantly, polling data recorded by sex in the 1920 election show that women
in Illinois were more supportive of Harding over Cox (Goldstein 1973). The Re-
publican gender gap emerged in 95% of all counties in Illinois in the 1920 election,
half of which exceeded a gap of 4%.
This contemporary narrative that associated women with the Republican Party,
however, was later questioned by many commentators and scholars. Immediately
after suffrage, many called the reform a ‘failure,’ mainly pointing to its subtle ef-
fects on partisan politics or low voter turnout among women (Andersen 1996, p.2;
Freeman 2002, p.170; Lemons 1973, pp.110-112). This skepticism persists today.
The idea that women voted as a block in the 1920 election is frequently dismissed
(Andersen 1996, p.153; Bagby 1962; p.160; Clark and Clark 2008, p.2; Freeman
2002, p.2; Kleppner 1987, p.178; Manza and Brooks 1998; Skocpol 1992, pp.505-
506). This skepticism generally relies on common perceptions such as women
1Chicago Tribune September 12, 1920; New York Times October 10, 1920; New York Times
November 3, 1920 Minneapolis Morning Tribune September 14, 1920 (see Corder and Wolbrecht
2011; Alpern and Baum 1985).
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voted like their husbands, that sex was not as divisive as religion or class, that
the observed differences rarely exceeded few percentage points and that partisan
platforms did not differ much on matters that were important for women. While
this skepticism captures important aspects of the historical context, quantitative
analyses of women’s voting behavior in the 1920 election are scarce. This is not sur-
prising given the fact that the most commonly used techniques, such as large-scale
surveys, were hard to find or mostly unreliable throughout the interwar period.2
As such, the only way to make quantitative inferences about women’s voting be-
havior in the 1920 election is with aggregate electoral data. The methodological
challenges of such approaches then often only add to the skepticism.
Two studies attempted to answer the question of how women voted in the
1920 election and both provide mixed evidence. Alpern and Baum (1985) analyze
sixteen Northern states and show that while women in the Mid-Atlantic states
supported Harding at a higher rate than men, these trends were reversed in the
Midwest and New England. Here, not only did Harding’s victory not rely on
women’s votes, but women even aligned with the Democrats. Overall, they con-
clude that while women’s votes did not copy those of men, Harding’s victory at
the national level could not be attributed to women.
The most recent analysis applying a Bayesian approach to ecological inference
also provides mixed evidence (Corder and Wolbrecht 2011). The authors found
that women were more likely to support Harding in most of the ten states they
studied, while women in Virginia were more likely to support Democrats. However,
they report that these differences were rarely statistically different from zero and
conclude that, as a whole, women’s votes did not significantly contribute to the
Republican landslide in 1920.
While both of these studies provide comprehensive analyses of electoral data,
two points should be made. First, both studies focus on a selected number of states
with most, if not all, of the Southern states, particularly the area of the Black
Belt, being excluded from the analysis. This is important as the Republican Party
made significant gains in the region, particularly in the Upper South. Second, both
studies analyze presidential elections only. This is important as split-ticketing may
2For example, Gallup was founded only in 1935 and did not start collecting election data
before 1936.
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have been more pronounced among new voters and this is generally attributed
to women’s weaker partisan attachments (Andersen 1996, p.100; Goldstein 1973,
p.76, 134-138, Schuyler 2006, p.85). In sum, no study has yet systematically
examined electoral data from all states affected by the Nineteenth Amendment in
Congressional elections. The aim of this study is to analyze a larger, new data set.
2.3.1 Theoretical Explanations for Women’s Partisan Tendencies
Along with contemporary anecdotal evidence, there are theoretical reasons that
link women to the Republican Party. The developmental thesis of the gender gap
argues that in the absence of the more recent structural and cultural trends which
affected women’s values, women aligned with conservative parties (Inglehart and
Norris 2000). While this theory aims to explain women’s voting behavior after
World War Two, it is plausible that its argument extends to the first half of the
twentieth century. Most contemporary explanations repeatedly stress women’s so-
cial conservatism as a possible channel for their Republican tendencies (Tingsten
1937; Duverger 1955; Ogburn and Goltra 1919; Randall 1987; Norris 1988). Amer-
ican women at the turn of the twentieth century tended to be more religious than
men, overwhelmingly supported temperance and maintained strong moral author-
ity both at home and in their communities (Goldstein 1973, p.168-175; Skocpol
1992, pp.323-328; Tyrrell 1991; US Census Bureau 1926, pp.14-19). In the 1920
election, Harding and the Republican Party were, on the whole, more supportive
of ‘dry’ policies; the link between religion, morality and prohibition never really
evaporated (Bagby 1960, p.151; Kleppner 1987, pp.205-207).
However, the conventional wisdom that women held conservative preferences is
not the only explanation for their political inclinations. Many argue that women,
in fact, held progressive and welfare preferences throughout the twentieth century.
Scholars have long emphasized women’s economic vulnerability as a predictor of
their redistributive preference (Edlund and Pande 2002; Iversen and Rosenbluth
2006; Lott and Kenny 1999), while the expansion of public budgets in the West
probably would not have been possible in the absence of female suffrage (Car-
ruthers and Wanamaker 2015; Lindert 1994; Miller 2008; Lott and Kenny 1999).
In the U.S., the progressive activism of women in the first half of the twentieth
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century has been at the heart of the Progressive era (Andersen 1996; pp.153-159;
Skocpol 1992, pp.56, 354; Dye 1991, pp.1-9). For example, the Sheppard-Towner
Act of 1921, which aimed to reduce maternal and infant mortality, is not only at-
tributed to women’s lobbying efforts, but also to politicians’ fear that failure to act
would be costly at an electoral level (Lemons 1973, p.157; Skocpol 1992, pp.497-
506). Not surprisingly, the Progressive Party enjoyed substantial support among
women, at least until its members re-joined the Republican camp (Goldstein 1973,
p.138; Gustafson 2001, p.116). In the 1920 election, Harding’s pro-business orien-
tation could hardly be considered progressive, yet former Progressives stayed with
the party. Harding’s social programs attempted to attract women, most of whom
were on the progressive wing of the Party (Bagby 1962, p.149; Freeman 2002, p.24;
Gustafson 2001, p.191; Lemons 1973, pp.87-9). To the extent that the Republican
Party better addressed women’s progressive preferences in the 1920 election, the
adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment should have produced a Republican shift.
Neither the developmental theory nor the economic thesis, however, consider
the specific context of the South. Much of Southern politics revolved around racial
issues, with Southern Democrats controlling the region by disenfranchising most of
the black population (Besley, Persson and Sturm 2010; Keyssar 2000, pp.303-368;
Kleppner 1987, pp.163-178). Fearing that women’s suffrage might bring the down-
fall of white supremacy, Southern Democrats fiercely opposed it (Banaszak 1996,
p.111; Sims pp.178-180). Indeed, the Nineteenth Amendment was rejected by eight
states, all of which were in the South. How Southern white women voted in the
1920 election, however, is still contested. Some argue that white women helped
to uphold white supremacy (Sims 1997, p.189). In fact, no organization of South-
ern white women challenged Jim Crow in the 1920s (Schuyler 2006, pp.185-187).
Others suggest that the suffrage benefited the Republican candidates (Schuyler
2006, pp.97-101). Democratic politicians were afraid that women would benefit
the Independents or that they would split their votes. Republican candidates, in
turn, were often ready to court white women’s votes by supporting racial hierarchy
in the region (Schuyler 2006, pp.85-96).
While woman’s suffrage did not lead to a Republican landslide in the South,
the Party made significant gains in the 1920 election. But the South was not a
monolith, nor was Republican success uniform throughout the region. The party
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had significantly increased its strength in the Upper South, while changes in the
Deep South were minimal. The area of the Black Belt, in particular, remained in
the strong control of the Democratic Party. The Black Belt was historically heavily
reliant on agriculture, signified by a large proportion of the black population. In
precisely these areas, the cost of any Republican gains and the threat to white
supremacy was at its highest. It follows that white women in the Black Belt might
defend white supremacy and vote Democrat, together with white men. White
women in other Southern areas might have perceived Republican gains as less
threatening and supported the Republican candidates as much as their Northern
counterparts.
2.4 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset that covers all counties without bound-
ary changes before and after the Nineteenth Amendment in all states affected by
the reform.3 The electoral returns were gathered from the United States Histor-
ical Election Returns, 1824-1968 (ICPR 00001). The socio-economic indicators
are from Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States
1790-2002 (ICPSR 02896). Figure 1 shows a map of states included in the sam-
ple. As most states in the West gave women full voting rights prior to the Nine-
teenth Amendment, the sample consists mostly of states in the Northeast, Mid-
west and the South. The sample excludes two Southern States, Mississippi and
Georgia, which defied the Nineteenth Amendment by failing to update the reg-
istration deadline for newly enfranchised women (Andersen 1996, p.50; Schuyler
2006, p.72). The sample also includes three states, Oklahoma, Michigan and South
Dakota, which gave women full voting rights before the Nineteenth Amendment,
but where women voted for the first time to Congress only in the 1920 election.4
3Absentee votes, soldier votes and at-large seats were excluded from the analysis. Only about
1.6% of counties changed boundaries between 1920 and 1918 and about 2.9% between 1918 and
1916.
4The inclusion of these states does not alter the substantive results, as shown in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: States Where Women Voted to Congress for the First Time
in 1920.
Note: States where women voted for the first time in Congressional elections in
1920 are light grey. Dark grey depicts states which were affected by the Nineteenth
Amendment, but defied it in the 1920 election.
2.5 Descriptive Statistics
2.5.1 Republican and Democratic Vote Shares 1918-1920
Figure 2 displays the change in support for Republican and Democratic candidates
between the 1918 and 1920 elections to the House of Representatives. In all states,
public support for the Republican Party rose from 46.4% to 53.9%, increasing its
share of the vote by about 7.6%. Support for Democratic candidates dropped by
5.7%. Since women in some states had already voted to Congress in the 1918
elections, we can compare trends in the sample states where women voted for the
first time to the House in 1920 to states where women had already voted in 1918
(that is, in states excluded from the sample). As we would expect, while the
Republican Party increased its support by nearly 12% in the sample states, it lost
6% in the states where women had already voted to Congress in 1918.
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Figure 2: Change in Republican and Democratic Support Between
1918 and 1920 Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, by
Sub-Samples.
Notes: ‘Total’ includes all states. ‘Sample’ refers to states in the main sample
where women voted to Congress for the first time in 1920. ‘Early’ includes all
states which adopted full female suffrage before the Nineteenth Amendment and
where women voted to Congress in the 1918 elections.
However, these results do not consider candidates who ran under several party
labels, such as ‘Republican and Prohibition’ in New York State. Most of these
ran alongside candidates from the main Republican Party and therefore rarely
attracted large number of voters. However, some of these candidates in the West
and New York State ran unopposed by the main party and received considerable
support. If such coalitions were included, the difference between the ‘sample’
and ‘early’ samples for the Republican Party would be significantly reduced: the
Republicans would have gained 6.9% in the early sample. At the same time, even
if such coalitions of the main and third parties were considered as support for
the Republican Party, the increase in support would remain higher in the treated
42
sample.
2.5.2 Key Independent Variable: Female Vote
In order to estimate the effect of female suffrage on partisan outcomes, I exploit
the variation in the proportion of women across counties. My key independent
variable, the female vote, thus refers to the proportion of eligible women of voting
age at the county level (see Figure 3). The proportion of adult women across
counties in the sample varies significantly, with 90% of all observations between
44.2% and 51.8%. There are counties with as few as 22.7% of women and some
with as many as 56.3%. The average female vote across all newly enfranchised
counties is 48.6%; the median is slightly to the right of the mean (48.9%).
Figure 3: Distribution of the Female Vote in All Counties Included
in the Sample.
The proportion of women across counties, however, is not exogenously assigned.
Those with a larger proportion of women of voting age can differ systematically
from counties with a lower proportion of women. Indeed, in my sample, more
women were in counties with higher population density, manufacturing output,
crop value and membership in the largest denominations (see correlates of the
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female vote in the Appendix). This is not surprising, as more remote areas have
been known to show higher sex ratios, often reflecting immigrants attraction for
male-dominated industries, such as mining and railroad construction (Hobbs and
Stoops 2000, pp.6263). Moreover, in the 1920s, there were five women church
members for every four men. The Methodists, in particular, had about two women
for every man (US Census Bureau 1926, pp.1419). If the county characteristics
that vary systematically with the proportion of women were also correlated with
vote choice, a model that regresses partisan support on the proportion of women
would return biased and inconsistent estimates. In this paper, I therefore regress
change in partisan support before and after the election on the proportion of women
(effectively change in the proportion of the newly enfranchised) thus controlling
for fixed-county characteristics that could confound the true relationship.
Figure 4: The Black Belt in the South in 1920.
Notes: Dark areas represent counties with a black population higher than 38.6%,
that is, the 90th percentile of black distribution in the sample.
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2.5.3 Plotting the Change in Partisan Vote Shares on Female Vote
Figure 4 depicts the Black Belt in the South, defined as counties with a higher
proportion of black population than the 90th percentile of the black distribution
in the sample. This cut-off point represents 38.6%. All counties with a higher
proportion of adult black population are in the South. Figure 5 plots the change
in the Republican vote share on the female vote. Since the effect of suffrage
should be conditional on the proportion of blacks in the South, the fitted line
(with 95% confidence intervals) is shown for Southern black counties. All other
counties are shown separately. Figure 5 reveals a positive correlation between the
change in the Republican vote share and the female vote in white counties, while
there is a negative correlation in the counties of the Black Belt. This pattern
reverses for the Democratic vote share, as shown in the appendix. While the
figure should be interpreted with caution as it does not control for district and
county-level characteristics, it provides correlational evidence that women voted
for the Republicans in mostly white areas.
2.6 Empirical Strategy: Difference in Difference
To uncover the causal relationship between suffrage and partisan outcomes, it
is necessary to isolate the effect of suffrage from possible confounding factors.
For example, if suffrage is adopted in localities which also exhibit socio-economic
characteristics that determine partisan outcomes, it is difficult to confidently link
partisan outcomes to the reforms. Moreover, the extension of women’s rights was
a calculated move by politicians in power who always considered its likely impact
(Braun and Kvasnicka 2013; Geddes and Lueck 2002; Przeworski 2009). As such,
studies that exploit variation in the adoption of female suffrage across states or
countries inevitably suffer from possible selection bias. My estimation strategy
goes a long way in tackling this issue. I exploit a variation in the strength of
suffrage within one country where the reform was imposed on all counties by a
federal amendment. I compare counties who received higher ‘dosage’ of treatment
to counties with lower treatment exposure. To this end, I exploit the variation
in the proportion of eligible women across all counties in the sample. The idea is
that counties with more women were more exposed to the treatment and therefore
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Figure 5: Plotting Change in the Republican Support (1920-1918)
on the Female Vote by 90th Percentile Black.
Notes: The grey dots and fitted line correspond to white counties. The black dots
and fitted line represents trends in the Black Belt.
should see a larger increase in Republican support. This strategy thus allows me
to eliminate any concerns that the treatment effects suffer from selection bias that
halts cross-sectional studies.
Using the sample of all counties where women voted for the first time to
Congress in 1920, I estimate the following difference in difference specification:
∆Yi1920−1918 = α + βFemaleV otei1920 + ∆i1920−1918 (1)
where ∆Y refers to a change in the partisan (Republican or Democratic) support
between the first election after the enfranchisement in 1920 and the last election
before the enfranchisement in 1918 in county i. Female Vote refers to the pro-
portion of eligible women in 1920. This variable effectively captures a change in
the proportion of newly enfranchised that were exposed to the treatment, which
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goes from 0 in 1918 to a proportion of eligible women in 1920. All regressions
include a constant which accounts for a trend across all enfranchised counties or
a coefficient on a single 1920 year dummy in a typical difference in difference set-
ting (Wooldridge 2010). Further, given that T=2, equation (1) is equivalent to
a fixed effects strategy with county and year dummies. One advantage of this
approach is that unobserved fixed county characteristics that could confound the
true relationship between suffrage and partisan outcomes are accounted for.
However, the estimates could still be biased and inconsistent if Republican
support was trending differently in counties with different treatment exposure.
In other words, if county characteristics were correlated with trends in partisan
support, the estimates might be spurious. This would occur if there were more
eligible women in 1920 in counties which also witnessed faster growth in Republican
support driven, for example, by black migration from the South to the North. In
tackling this possibility I employ two strategies. First, I include a number of socio-
economic variables at their pre-suffrage levels, their change over five years prior
to suffrage and district specific shocks. The controls consist of population density,
value of all crops, total manufacturing output and proportion of adult blacks,
illiterates and main religious affiliations. Including the change in these control
variables addresses some concerns that the effect of interest might be driven by
trends such as migration from South to North. Second, I regress the change in
partisan outcomes between the 1918 and 1916 elections on the proportion of eligible
women in 1920. I show that these placebo tests confirm the validity of the parallel
trend assumption prior to the enfranchisement. This means that counties with
more eligible women in 1920 did not witness any trend in partisan outcomes prior
to the reform.
The idea of using the ‘dosage’ of suffrage in examining its effects on political
outcomes was first applied by Berlinski and Dewan (2011) and is now a frequently
used technique in estimating the effects of suffrage on both political and economic
outcomes (Carruthers and Wanamaker 2014; Kroth, Larcinese and Wehrner 2015;
Larcinese 2014; Vernby 2013). Contrary to some of the studies that estimate the
effect of suffrage on partisan outcomes, however, this study poses an additional ad-
vantage. Since women were enfranchised in one fell swoop, the ‘dosage’ of suffrage
across counties cannot be manipulated by the government. For example, Berlinski
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and Dewan (2011) exploit the fact that male suffrage was gradually extended to
men of a certain income. However, precisely because the income level was set by
the government, it could be manipulated by the authorities in order to minimize
(or enhance) its effect. In this study, the Nineteenth Amendment did not grant
votes to some women in a county and therefore did not allow the authorities to ma-
nipulate its impact. This strategy thus eliminates any concerns that the treatment
is endogenously assigned
2.7 Results: Measuring the Effects of Female Suffrage on
Partisan Support
As shown in Figure 2, the pro-Republican shift was most profound in states where
women voted for the first time to Congress in 1920. In this section I address
whether this pro-Republican shift was caused by female suffrage. In particular, I
examine whether the Republicans increased their support more in counties which
were most affected by the reform. Table 1 reports baseline results for the effect of
the female vote on the change in Republican and Democratic vote shares respec-
tively. The first column shows baseline estimates without any controls. The second
column adds controls fixed at the 1919 levels and differenced over the period from
1914-1919. The third column includes district fixed effects and controls fixed at
1919 levels. The fourth column includes all controls and district fixed effects.
Models 1 to 4 show consistently negative coefficients for the Democratic can-
didates and positive coefficients for the Republican candidates. However, the size
of the estimates responds strongly to the addition of controls and district shocks.
After adding all controls and district fixed effects, Model 4 estimates that the
Republicans gained 0.276% of votes for every 1% increase in the proportion of
women, while the Democrats lost 0.361%. Both effects are significant at the 5%
level.
However, the specific context of the South might have altered women’s prefer-
ences, particularly in the areas of the Black Belt. In order to test whether the effect
of female suffrage is conditional on the level of threat to white supremacy, I split
the sample by the 90th percentile of the black distribution. The 90thpercentile cor-
responds to 38.6% of blacks in a county and all counties with a higher proportion of
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Table 1: The Effect of Female Vote on Change in Electoral
Support for Republican and Democratic Candidates 1920-1918
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
a)Rep. votes 1920-1918
Female vote (%) 1.072*** 1.074*** 0.149 0.276**
(0.155) (0.224) (0.127) (0.13)
Model (5) (6) (7) (8)
b) Dem. votes 1920-1918
Female vote (%) -0.423 -0.962*** -0.236 -0.361**
(0.165) (0.245) (0.144) (0.141)
District FEs x x Yes Yes
Controls (1919) x Yes Yes Yes
Controls (1919-1914) x Yes x Yes
Obs. 2240 2073 2013 1997
Notes: Controls for 1919 levels include: ln(population density); % Adult
black; % Adult illiterate; % Roman Catholics; % Baptists; % Methodists;
Value of all crops; Total manufacturing output; Differenced controls over
1919-1914 include all as above but % Total black population and % Adult
male illiterate; Robust standard errors in parentheses; All models include a
constant; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
blacks are located in the South. The results are reported in Table 2. Once counties
of the Black Belt are excluded from the sample, the estimates in the white sample
become slightly larger. In the Black Belt counties, however, suffrage increased
Democratic vote share. These estimates are not significant at conventional levels.
The results are, therefore, compatible with the explanation that while women in
all regions preferred the Republican candidates, white women in the Black Belt
supported the Democratic candidates as much as white men, if not more so.
The main results are robust to the number of different specifications, as shown
in the Appendix. First, splitting the sample with alternative cut-off points does
not change the results in the white counties (Table 1 in the Appendix). As the
cut-off point decreases, the black counties include more Northern counties with a
substantial proportion of enfranchised blacks. As a result, the positive estimate
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for the Democratic candidates slowly disappears with decreasing cut-off points.
Second, Table 2 in the Appendix shows that including counties with boundary
changes does not change the main results. Third, Table 3 in the Appendix shows
that the main results are robust to the exclusion of three states which approved
female suffrage in the legislatively referred referendum in 1918, but where women
voted for the first time to Congress in 1920.
50
Table 2: The Effect of the Female Vote on Change in Electoral Support for Republican and
Democratic candidates 1920-1918, by 90th Percentile Black.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
a) Rep. votes 1920-1918
Female vote (%) -0.737*** -0.603 -0.329 -0.505 1.3*** 1.428*** 0.248* 0.414***
(0.271) (0.408) (0.307) (0.324) (0.174) (0.242) (0.132) (0.146)
Model (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
b)Dem. votes 1920-1918
Female vote (%) 1.028*** 0.332 0.159 0.323 -0.308* -1.31*** -0.417*** -0.506***
(0.359) (0.438) (0.299) (0.325) (0.184) (0.265) (0.143) (0.158)
District FEs x x Yes Yes x x Yes Yes
Controls (1919) x Yes Yes Yes x Yes Yes Yes
Controls (1919-1914) x Yes x Yes x Yes x Yes
Obs. 224 214 215 214 2016 1859 1798 1783
Sample Black Black Black Black White White White White
Notes: See notes in Table 1. ‘White’ corresponds to counties with less than 39% of blacks (90th percentile of black
distribution), ‘Black’ refers to counties with more than 39% of blacks.
2.8 Robustness Checks
2.8.1 Placebo Tests
The difference in difference estimation strategy allows to control for county char-
acteristics correlated with the proportion of women. However, the estimates may
still be driven by pre-existing trends in the outcome variable. For example, the
support for Republican candidates could have been growing faster in counties with
a large proportion of women. Such a violation in the parallel trend assumption
can be tested by regressing the change in partisan support between the 1918 and
1916 elections on female vote. Table 3 reports the estimates. Once all controls are
included, none of the placebo regressions return large and significant estimates.
This only occurs in models that do not control for district fixed effects. Republi-
can support has, therefore, been trending differently prior to the reform, but any
such trends were removed with the addition of district fixed effects.
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Table 3: The Effect of the Female Vote on Change in Electoral Support for Republican and Democratic Candidates
1918–1916 (Placebo Regressions)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
a) Rep. votes 1918-1916
Female vote (%) -0.935*** -0.361 -0.081 -0.141 0.283 -0.585 0.141 0.146 -0.922*** -0.552* -0.071 -0.148
(0.163) (0.266) (0.131) (0.165) (0.331) (0.502) (0.33) (0.363) (0.182) (0.292) (0.159) (0.195)
b) Dem. votes 1918-1916 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
Female vote (%) -0.051 0.324 -0.1 -0.098 -0.408 0.607 -0.152 -0.126 -0.1 0.519* -0.144 -0.123
(0.141) (0.263) (0.132) (0.162) (0.389) (0.555) (0.331) (0.359) (0.158) (0.288) (0.156) (0.187)
District FEs x x Yes Yes x x Yes Yes x x Yes Yes
Controls (1919) x Yes Yes Yes x Yes Yes Yes x Yes Yes Yes
Controls (1919-1914) x Yes x Yes x Yes x Yes x Yes x Yes
Sample All All All All Black Black Black Black White White White White
Obs. 2174 2027 1968 1953 212 207 208 207 1962 1820 1760 1728
Notes: See notes for Table 1.
2.8.2 Restricting the Pool of Eligible Voters with Registration, Poll
Taxes and Literacy Tests
At the turn of the century, most states restricted the pool of eligible voters by
registration, poll taxes and literacy tests (Carlson 1976; Harris 1929; Keyssar
2000). These restrictions could drive the pro-Republican effect in white counties.
If, for example, areas with more women also had the most stringent restrictions,
the estimates from the difference in difference strategy might be biased and in-
consistent, particularly if the restrictions affected mainly poorer and Democratic
segments of the society. Moreover, any type of legal restrictions affected women
more than men (Anderson 1996, p.51; Corder and Wolbrecht 2006; Wilkerson-
Freeman 2002). Unfortunately, the number of registered voters by county is not
systematically available for the relevant period. I have, therefore, run a number
of models in various sub-samples by the severity of restrictions. Table 3 splits
the white sample by severity of registration restrictions, literacy tests and poll
taxes and replicates the results. Since the estimates are comparable across the
sub-samples, it is suggestive that the main result in white counties is not driven
by variation in restrictions to eligible pool of voters.
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Table 4: Restricting the Pool of Eligible Votes with Registration, Poll Taxes
and Literacy Tests in White Counties
No/Low High Lit. No lit. Poll No poll
reg. reg. test test tax tax
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a) Rep. votes 1920-1918
Female vote (%) 0.554** 0.444** 0.847** 0.339** 0.545* 0.246*
(0.254) (0.196) (0.427) (0.155) (0.296) (0.148)
Model (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
b) Dem. votes 1920-1918
Female vote (%) -0.522** -0.609*** -0.758* -0.472*** -0.811** -0.208
(0.257) (0.213) (.428) (0.171) (0.323) (0.154)
District FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (1919) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (1919-1914) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample White White White White White White
Obs. 658 1125 314 1469 550 1233
Notes: See notes for Table 1.
2.8.3 Alternative Explanations Examined with Data from Chicago
The most severe concern of my identification strategy is that the national pro-
Republican effect might be driven by increased mobilization of men in response to
female suffrage. If men mobilized at higher levels in counties with more women,
the partisan effect of suffrage would rely on the voting behavior of men rather than
women. In this section, I therefore exploit data from Chicago, where the authorities
kept polling records separated by sex in the early twentieth century. The first two
columns in Table 5 show that there is indeed a positive correlation between the
proportion of women and the registration levels of men in both the 1914 and 1916
elections. Men registered at higher levels in wards with more women. There is
no effect on men’s turnout levels. However, none of these regressions control for
third factors. In the last two columns in Table 5, I therefore regress the change
in men’s registration and turnout levels between the 1914-1916 and 1911 elections
on the proportion of women. While women voted in the 1914 and 1916 elections,
they did not have the vote until 1911. This identification strategy, as in the main
study, thus controls for fixed county characteristics correlated with the proportion
of women. If men mobilized more in wards with more women, we should find a
positive effect. Yet the models in Table 5 return much smaller coefficients which
are not even close to conventional levels of statistical significance. At least in
Chicago, it seems that men did not turnout or register at higher levels in localities
with a higher proportion of women.
Another concern of my identification strategy is that the pro-Republican effect
of female suffrage might be a result of higher mobilization of Republican women.
Indeed, scholars argue that Republican women were better organized (Bagby 1962,
p.152; Freeman 2002, p.24). I again exploit the data from Chicago where author-
ities kept polling records separated by sex. Indeed, women were more supportive
of Republican candidates in wards where they registered and voted at higher rates
(see the first two panels in Table 6). However, none of these models controls for
third factors. Socio-economic characteristics at the ward level may both increase
women’s support for Republican candidates and their electoral participation. I
therefore regress the change in the Republican vote share among women between
the 1920 and 1916 elections on the change in registration and turnout rates among
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Table 5: The Effect of the Proportion of Women in Chicago on
Male Registration and Turnout
Dep. variable: Male registr. Male registr. Male registr. Male registr.
1914 1916 1914-1911 1916-1911
Female (%) 1.609*** 1.72*** 0.029 0.124
(0.446) (0.557) (0.329) (0.288)
Obs. 35 35 34 34
Dep. variable: Male turnout Male turnout Male turnout Male turnout
1914 1916 1914-1911 1916-1911
Female (%) 0.235 -0.178 0.027 -0.305
(0.308) (0.398) (0.244) (0.392)
Obs. 35 35 34 34
Notes: Data sourced from Goldstein (1973) and US Census Bureau. Data
for registration rates utilizes 1911 municipal elections, 1914 school elections
and 1916 presidential elections. Data for voter turnout utilizes 1911 municipal
elections, 1914 and 1916 general elections; All regressions include a constant;
Voter turnout is defined as a proportion of voters among registered; Robust
standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *
significant at 10%.
women between 1920 and 1916. Once fixed ward characteristics hold constant, the
positive effect disappears (see last panel in Table 6). At least in Chicago, areas
where women mobilized at higher levels in the 1920 rather than the 1916 election
were not areas where the Republican Party made larger gains.
2.9 Final Remarks
In this paper I show that the newly enfranchised women supported Republican
candidates more often than men and as such contributed to the Republican land-
slide in the 1920 election. In the Southern Black Belt, newly enfranchised white
women voted for Democratic candidates as much as white men. This paper thus
provides evidence for long-held narratives that associated women with the Re-
publican Party and white Southern women with white supremacy in the region.
Contrary to existing research, women’s partisan preferences were different from
57
Table 6: The Effect of Women’s Registration and
Turnout on Women’s Vote Choice in Chicago
Dep. variable: Republican vote 1916 (%)
Registration 1916 (%) 0.709***
(0.126)
Turnout 1916 (%) 0.633
(0.424)
Obs. 35 35
Dep. variable: Republican vote 1920 (%)
Registration 1920 (%) 0.674***
(0.165)
Turnout 1920 (%) 0.666***
(0.234)
Obs. 35 35
Dep. variable: Republican vote 1920-1916 (%)
Registration 1920-1916 (%) 0.114
(0.251)
Turnout 1920-1916 (%) -0.058
(0.155)
Obs. 35 35
Notes: Data are sourced from Goldstein (1973). Data for fall reg-
istration rates 1916 and 1920 and presidential electoral returns in
1916 and 1920; All regressions include a constant; Voter turnout is
defined as a proportion of voters among registered; Robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at
5%; * significant at 10%.
those of men and had the power to affect the constellation of parties in Congress.
While a number of earlier studies addressed the question of how women voted
in the early twentieth century, the results have been mixed. Moreover, all stud-
ies so far have examined presidential elections in either a single town, state or a
group of selected states, excluding most Southern states. It follows that this is
the first study that systematically examines women’s voting behavior in all newly
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enfranchised states. Future work may try to examine the variation in women’s Re-
publican tendencies across states and in additional elections. It may also attempt
to further examine whether the developmental or the economic thesis can better
explain women’s Republican tendencies.
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3 After the Vote: Programmatic Preferences and
Women’s Loyalty
Abstract
Did expanding the electoral franchise to women make a dent in electoral pol-
itics? In this paper we examine three hypotheses that link women’s political
preferences to electoral outcomes: first is the ‘traditional’ voting gap thesis
that claims that women historically supported conservative parties. The
second ‘distributive politics’ thesis argues that because women’s economic
position was historically insecure, women prefer higher taxation and larger
safety nets, and therefore support parties with redistributive programs. Fi-
nally, there is an ‘electoral co-optation’ argument that female voters were
loyal to the party that secured their political emancipation. Exploiting vari-
ation in the proportion of women across locales for four suffrage reforms in
Protestant countries, we use a difference-in-difference strategy to adjudicate
between these theories. Because the ‘treatment effect’ of women’s enfran-
chisement is higher in constituencies with a higher proportion of women, our
approach can provide insight into the causal effect of women’s enfranchise-
ment on electoral outcomes. Our findings do not support the traditional
voting gap theory or the argument that women rewarded their enfranchisers
independent of programmatic concerns. Instead, women’s enfranchisement
bolstered support for parties with redistributive agendas that often provided
long-term support for women’s suffrage.
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‘[Women’s enfranchisement] ‘spells a disaster for Liberalism [ it would]
add hundreds of thousands of votes throughout the country to the
strength of the Tory Party.’ (Lloyd George of the United Kingdom,
1911)
‘[Extending the vote to women] ‘will double the majority against us
and make the country more communistic than it is already.’ (G.G.
Stead of New Zealand, 1911)
3.1 Introduction
The admission of women into the voting public was one of the most remarkable
social and political transformations of the last century. While only three countries
extended full national voting rights to women prior to 1900, by 2000, in nearly
every country where men could vote, so too could women.1 The roots of feminist
mobilization are often traced to women’s involvement in the abolition movement in
the middle of the nineteenth century, and the quest for the vote itself often emerged
from female-driven movements for sanitation, educational reform, property rights,
labor protection, and temperance. As the quotes by Lloyd George and G.G. Stead
of New Zealand indicate, even before women gained voting rights, male actors
were concerned with trying to understand which parties women would support and
which public policies they would demand. To the extent that feminist demands
for particular public policies were linked to the programmatic commitments of
individual parties, bringing women into the electorate should have influenced the
policies pursued by political parties that subsequently courted women’s votes, as
well as the distribution of political power within national legislatures.
Although the effect of women’s enfranchisement on policy outcomes has been
widely studied, the influence of franchise extension on partisan performance after
the vote was won has not received much scholarly attention.2 Among the few
exceptions is a case study of the United States, which suggests that American
1The early enfranchisers include the Isle of Man, 1881; Cook Islands, 1893, while still a British
protectorate; New Zealand 1893; and several territories and states on the United States’ western
frontier.
2On the policy effects of women’s enfranchisement see Harvey (1996), Lott and Kenny (1999),
Miller (2008), Abrams and Settle (1999), Aidt and Dallal (2008), Bertocchi (2010).
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women mostly supported the Republican Party after the passage of the Nineteenth
Amendment in 1920 (Morgan-Collins 2016),3 and early studies by Duverger (1955)
and Tingsten (1937), which relied on only a handful of localities that used separate
ballots to tally male and female votes prior to 1960, which argues that when
women differed from men, their commitments were generally more conservative.
Limited by both geographical scope and temporal reach, previous investigations
have hardly settled the question of women’s political behavior after the vote was
won.
In this paper we argue that the introduction of women’s suffrage had significant
and hitherto unknown consequences for party politics. Using unique sub-national
datasets for several countries – in this draft three protesatnt countries (U.K.,
Canada, and Norway) – we examine three competing theses that link women’s
political preferences to electoral outcomes: first is the ‘traditional’ voting gap
thesis that claims that women historically supported conservative parties. Second,
is an ‘electoral co-optation’ argument that female voters were loyal to the party
that secured their political emancipation. Finally, the ‘distributive politics’ thesis
argues that because women’s economic position was historically vulnerable, women
preferred higher taxation and larger safety nets, and therefore supported parties
with redistributive programs.
We show that neither the electoral co-optation thesis nor the traditional voting
gap thesis fully explain women’s preferences in Protestant countries. In neither
contry women supported a party with a conservative agenda. Parties that presided
over suffrage reform for women also did not benefit from the reforms. The impact
of women’s enfranchisement did not help the Conservative party in Canada, the
Tories in the United Kingdom or the Liberals in Norway. Instead, in the United
Kingdom and Canada, the Liberal Party benefitted from the reforms and in Nor-
3Another exception is a cross-sectional study which examines long-term effects of the adoption
of suffrage on partisan outcomes (Morgan-Collins 2015). This study shows that while suffrage
increased the support for Socialist parties in the Protestant North, Christian Democratic parties
benefitted from the reforms in the Catholic South. As Christian Democratic parties catered to
both women’s conservative and redistributive preferences, it is argued that, in the absence of such
parties, women voted along with their economic needs over their conservative values. However, as
women’s support for socialists have only evolved over time (Huber and Stephens 2000), it remains
unclear whether women supported parties with redistributive agendas immediately after suffrage.
To this end, a comparative study that seeks to unravel causal relationship between suffrage and
partisan support immediately after suffrage is essential.
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way, a higher share of women in a given locality increased the vote shares of the
Labour Party. Our findings, which cut against the traditional voting gap theory,
indicate that women’s enfranchisement have led to a leftward swing in political
power. Where women stayed loyal to a party, it was a party which showed long-
term support for women’s suffrage rather than the immediate enfranchisers.
In order to analyze the impact of women’s enfranchisement on partisanship,
we exploit the fact that the effects of a national-level reform were not necessarily
homogenous throughout a given country. Because franchise reform would have
increased the size of the electorate to a greater extent in places with a lower male
to female ratio than in places with a higher ratio, the change in size of the eligible
electorate with the addition of women dependened on the mix of genders across
locales. For example, mining towns or areas where oil is extracted typically have
higher ratios of men to women than areas with large manufacturing or service-
based industries. The uneven geographical distribution of women can therefore
serve as a measure of the intensity of franchise reform in electoral constituencies.
Under several assumptions, and when placed in a difference-in-difference frame-
work, variation in the intensity of the reform can be used to estimate the causal
impact of women’s enfranchisement on partisan outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized in the typical way. The next section outlines
the theoretical reasons why women may have influenced partisan outcomes, and
documents the empirical findings that bolster these arguments. The third section
describes our empirical approach including selection of the cases that fall inside
the relevant scope of this investigation, and the identification strategy that we
use to estimate the impact of women’s enfranchisement on partisan outcomes.
After that, we present the data and summary statistics, followed by results. We
present results separately for each country in our analysis so that we can provide
background context for the pertinent reforms and describe the relevant context-
specific control variables used in each country’s analysis. A very brief conclusion
closes the paper.
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3.2 Why Women’s Enfranchisement May Have Mattered
For Politial Power
Prominent scholars of democratization, such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)
have claimed that women’s enfranchisement had no substantive political effects but
in fact, many studies have shown that women’s enfranchisement produced dramatic
changes in the size and nature of social spending.4 Similarly, scholars often argued
that, by and large, women voted along with their husbands (Duverger 1955) or
that the expected effects of women’s suffrage never really materialized (Andersen
1996). Nevertheless, while the fiscal effects of women’s political inclusion has been
well studied, the influence of franchise extension on partisan performance after
the vote was won, especially outside of the United States, has not received much
scholarly attention.5
There are several theoretical reasons to believe that male and female voters
held distinct preferences for political parties, and that women’s enfranchisement
should have influenced electoral outcomes. The theoretical reasons why intro-
ducing women to the electorate will not automatically double the votes for each
party have to do with women’s distinctive position in economic and social hier-
archies. Especially before the twentieth century, women were often legally barred
from owning property, forming contracts, or taking jobs without the consent of
their husbands. For these reasons, women of all backgrounds might have preferred
family-centered policies or overall larger governments and safely nets. This could
militate towards support for conservative or leftist parties.6
4Acemoglu and Robinson (2000: 1186) claim in particular that women’s enfranchisement did
not matter for redistribution, an argument that is contradicted by much of the recent literature.
For example, Miller (2008) finds immediate changes in public health expenditures after state-level
women’s enfranchisement in the United States. He then links the fiscal flows to major reductions
in childhood mortality that emerged relatively shortly after women won the vote. Studying
welfare state expenditures in Western Europe from 1869 to 1960, Aidt and Dallal (2008) find
that in the period immediately following women’s enfranchisement, public spending as a fraction
of GDP rose by one percent, with long-term effects estimated as being between three to eight
times larger. Finally, in Switzerland, Abrams and Settle (1999) show a 28 percent increase in
the public budget after it enfranchised women in the 1970s.
5For women’s voting behaviour in the United States see Corder and Wolbrecht (2006, 2011)
and Morgan-Collins (2016)
6On the empirical side there is ample documentation of gender-based voting gap in advanced
industrialized countries after World War II, which may also have existed before polling became
commonplace. For example, in the 1970s, women in Italy, Germany, Britain, Belgium, France and
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To the extent that women’s distinct political preferences were translated into
partisan preferences, we should expect the newly enfranchised women to vote dif-
ferently than men. Our review of the existing historical, economic and political
literature leads us to formulate three competing theses that link women’s votes to
specific partisan outcomes.
3.2.1 Distributive Politics Thesis
Using economic class as the most important signal of political preferences, political
economy accounts of franchise extension generally assume that if poorer voters are
enfranchised by a given reform, the reform will benefit the Left. The arguments
are iterative, with parties supporting reform based on their expectations about the
preferences of the newly enfranchised voters. In several accounts, left-leaning par-
ties support enfranchisement because the working classes are ideologically biased
towards the left (e.g. Lizzeri and Persico 2004). On the other hand, if the ru-
ral economy is large compared to the industrial economy, landowners may believe
that rural workers may be loyal to their cause, and hence will support franchise
extension as a way to increase the political power of land over capital (Llavador
and Oxoby 2005).
Applying this class-based logic to the partisan effects of women’s enfranchise-
ment leads to a prediction that introducing women into the electorate should
generally produce a leftward shift in partisanship. Even within classes women are
generally more economically vulnerable than men. Under the fairest economic and
legal conditions women are more likely than men to take time away from the labor
market in order to bear and raise children, which decreases their lifetime earnings
relative to men even when they have considerable labor market power. In the era
of women’s enfranchisement, the economic vulnerability of women was even more
pronounced than it is today. To the extent that women participated at all in formal
the Netherlands evinced stronger preferences than men for right-leaning parties, while women in
the United States were somewhat more likely to vote for the Left (Inglehart and Norris, 2000:
443). The left-preference of American women has grown considerably since the 1970s, although
recent research shows that this trend is more pronounced for college educated women (Gillion
et al. 2014). In the 1990s, women were more left-wing in nearly all of the advanced industrial
economies save for Britain, France, Australia, Finland, and Spain (Inglehart and Norris, 2000:
449).
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economic labor markets, they faced an even greater wage gap than exists today
(Goldin 1994); and often did not have the right to keep their property when they
entered in marriage; or to determine the use of their wages once earned (Skocpol
1992; Tilly and Scott 1987). The former suggests that women as a whole would
have had rational economic reasons to prefer higher levels of redistribution than
men, and that women’s enfranchisement may have translated into more support
for left-leaning parties with redistributive platforms.
H1: Women’s vulnerable economic status leads to preferences for left-leaning
parties with redistributive agendas. On average, women’s enfranchisement should
increase support for the left.
3.2.2 Traditional Voting Gap Thesis
Moving away from a purely economic logic of voting, the traditional voting gap
thesis attributes conservative values to women stemming from their roles as moth-
ers, homemakers, and churchgoers. These social roles, which gave women power in
a ‘separate sphere’ from the male public sphere, were seen as enhancing women’s
moral superiority vis--vis men (Skocpol 1992), and would have driven them to vote
on issues of social and moral purity, such as for prohibition or against prostitution
(Goldstein 1973; Norris 1988; Randall 1981; Tingsten 1937).7
According to the ‘developmental’ history of the gender voting gap, it is only af-
ter the long-term structural and cultural trends which affected women’s and men’s
life, such as increased higher education attainment and paid employment of women,
that women changed their conservative values and supported parties on the left
(Inglehart and Norris 2000). Before the second wave of feminist mobilization, that
is, in the era in which many women around the world won the vote, women would
have supported conservative parties (Norris 1988; Randall 1987). Summarizing the
7However it is important to emphasize that while temperance may have been an important
issue in the United States and some of the British colonies, it was not an important issue in
most suffrage movements, including the United Kingdom. Moreover, which party picked up the
tempernce issue varied accross counries. While the Republican and Conservative Parties showed
somewhat warmer reception to prohibition in the U.S. and Canada, the political right in Norway
and New Zealand fiercely opposed such measures as a state intervention of the free market.
Such differences generally stemmed from the fact that the temperance movements were both
expressions of moral and social gospels as well as progressive demands that sought to ameliorate
women’s position in the home.
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limited polling data available for the Netherlands, Norway, France and Germany
in the 1940s and 1950s, Duverger (1955) finds that there are differences between
male and female voting patterns, with women tending to be more conservative
than men overall. At the same time, the conservative gender gap in Protestant
countries often does not exceed few percentage points and relies solely on women’s
support for Christian Democratic parties in Catholic countries.
H2: Because women have historically more traditional values, bringing them
into the electorate should lead to increased support for conservaive parties.
3.2.3 Electoral Co-Optation
Women’s support for parties with redistributive or conservative agendas, however,
might not necessarily mean that women’s votes reflected their left or right-leaning
political values. It is possible that women instead rewarded parties for their ef-
forts to enfranchise them. In many countries, the final vote to enfranchise women
often received broad-based support. For example, neither major party in the U.S.
adopted suffrage on its platform until both did in 1916 (Banaszak 1996). Subse-
quently, both the Democratic and Republican parties attempted to use the ‘suf-
frage’ card to attract women’s votes in the first election under universal suffrage
(Andersen 1996). In Canada, the Conservative Party in Ontario only enfran-
chised women once the Liberals made a promise to women, hoping to win thankful
women’s votes (Bacchi 1983, p.138). This suggests that as political tides shifted,
strategic parties may have clamored to be seen as the party responsible for the
extension, hoping to win women’s votes as a show of loyalty.
In fact, Przeworski (2009) argues that political parties support women’s suf-
frage only if they expect to benefit from the reforms. In a similar vein, Teele
(2014) shows that one reason why the U.K.’s Labour party took women’s enfran-
chisement on its platform was in the hopes of converting women to their party.
In the words of Henry Noel Brailsford, a Labour party activist and British jour-
nalist, ‘I believe that in the course of a fighting alliance [between Labour and the
suffragists] much of them would end by becoming decided and permanent adher-
ents of the Labour party.’8 Once such strategic incentives are taken into account,
8Writing to Arthur Henderson, who later became the first Labor leader to have a posi-
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women should support parties which enfranchised them. To the extent that loyalty
dominated women’s minds in the first elections following their inclusion, women’s
suffrage should not have a uniform effect on partisanship.
H3: Women will be loyal to the party that enfranchised them, so adding women
to the electorate will increase support for the party that was in power when the
reform passed.
3.3 Empirical Approach
We are interested in understanding the electoral consequences of women’s enfran-
chisement within countries. We first describe the criteria used to determine which
countries are included in the dataset, and then describe our identification strategy.
3.3.1 Case Selection
We used four criteria to determine which countries should be included in our study:
first, a country had to pass a single piece of legislation, mostly enfranchising women
at the national level; second, this country had to be a democracy before and after
the reform, with a relatively stable party system across the relevant time period;
third, the reform must not be concurrent with other major electoral reforms, such
as changes to the male franchise laws or during a year in which boundaries of local
units were revised; finally, we must be able to locate electoral returns for electoral
units smaller than the national level. These criteria are further illuminated in the
Appendix with reference to a few concrete examples. The appendix provides, for
152 countries, a summary of whether the country is apt for inclusion in this study.
In this version we present results for 4 Protestant countries – Norway, U.K. and
Canada.
tion in the cabinet, in May 1912. Letter housed in the Labour History Archive, Manchester,
U.K.:LP/WOM/12/14/6-May-2012. Many suffragists also believed that their ties to any given
party were fragile: as Lady Selbourn put it, the Conservative Tories were likely to get a shock
by seeing her name on a petition alongside the socialist Charlotte Despard, but that is because
the parties took for granted the fact that women’s votes would go the way of their class: ‘Unless
these people [the party leaders] can be made to understand that party ties are fragile under the
stress of delay, they will not act.’
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3.3.2 Identification Strategy
To examine whether electoral outcomes are causally related to women’s suffrage,
our identification strategy attempts to isolate the effect of suffrage from its poten-
tial confounders by exploiting variation in the intensity of suffrage reform across
locales. Although the female suffrage was generally adopted nationally, and mostly
affected all of a country’s electoral districts, because the proportion of women var-
ied geographically, some localities were affected by the reforms more than others.
Thus, while traditional studies of the effect of franchise extension use temporal
and spatial variation in suffrage adoption at the national- or state-level, our ap-
proach exploits the fact that reforms will have heterogeneous effects within cases
depending on the ratios of men to women in different electoral constituencies.
Variation in the proportion of women across electoral units can be used to esti-
mate causal effect of women’s enfranchisement on partisanship using a difference-
in-difference approach. Specifically, we regress the change in partisan support be-
fore and after suffrage reforms on a continuous measure of the intensity of suffrage
reform. This method is now a well-established strategy used in uncovering the ef-
fects of suffrage on electoral, political, and policy outcomes, particularly for reforms
that affected the male franchise (Berlinski and Dewan 2011; Carruthers and Wana-
maker 2014; Kroth, Larcinese and Wehrner 2015; Larcinese 2014; Morgan-Collins
2016; Vernby 2013). To summarize, the idea behind the estimation strategy is
simple: if women historically voted differently than men, locales where the reform
was more intense – because the female population was relatively large compared
to other locales – should witness a larger changes in partisan support than locales
with fewer women.
At first glance we might think that women are always and only 50 percent of
the population, but while it is generally true on average, it is not necessarily true
for every constituency – think of New York City and Denver (‘Menver’), which
have higher ratios of women to men today. These differences in sex ratios also
varied significantly throughout history. For example, in the U.S., patterns of mi-
gration and economic employment opportunities in the frontier states determined
sex ratios (Braun and Kvasnicka 2013). In some frontier towns, there may have
been only one woman for every five men. For our identification strategy to work,
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there must be variation in the intensity of reform as measured by sex ratios, and
there must be a large number of observations for any given national unit.
There are two ways in which the intensity of suffrage can be operationalized.
First, a proportion of eligible women at a local level can be used as an indicator of
the size of suffrage reform. It follows that locales with higher proportion of eligible
women are more affected by suffrage than locales with lower proportion of eligible
women. Second, a change in the size of the electorate before and after suffrage can
also indicate the intensity of suffrage reform, where locales with larger increases
in the size of the electorate are assumed to have more eligible women, and have
therefore more effected by the reform than districts with a smaller increase in the
size of the electorate. While some countries provide detailed census data on the
demographic composition of electoral districts, others provide only accounts of the
size of the electorate. Given these data limitations, we use whichever of the two
specifications is possible.
We present results separately for each country in our analysis, using a difference-
in-difference estimator that takes the following form:
∆Yit = α + β∆ln(Electorate)it + ∆it (2)
where ∆Y refers to a change in partisan outcomes before and after suffrage; i
refers to the observational unit whether municipalities, constituencies, ridings, or
counties (see Table 1); and t refers to the first general election after suffrage.
∆ln(Electorate) refers to a difference in the log of district level electorate before
and after the reform. The log form allows for a natural interpretation of the change
in the electorate in percentage terms. Finally, it is a random disturbance term.
This estimation strategy is equivalent to a fixed effect strategy with district- and
time- dummies which capture potential fixed confounders at the local-level.
3.3.3 Causality Concerns
The identification strategy raises several concerns for drawing valid causal in-
ferences. First, if district characteristics are correlated with trends in partisan
support, our results might be biased and inconsistent. This would happen, for
example, if parties that represented women’s preferences were already gaining mo-
mentum in districts with more women. In tackling this possibility, we apply a
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series of placebo tests to examine whether districts with larger intensity of suf-
frage were trending differently before the reform. In neither case we find that
parties that benefitted from women’s suffrage were already on a rise prior to the
reforms.
A second main threat to causality is that our results might be driven by men’s
rather than women’s behavior. Previous research has shown that in some political
and historical contexts, dominant groups have mobilize at higher levels to ‘negate’
the voting power of the newly enfranchised oppressed groups (Washington 2006).
In other words, if men mobilized at higher levels in localities with higher propor-
tion of women, our results would be driven by men’s rather than women’s voting
behavior. In tackling this possibility, we can use data from countries which tallied
votes separately by sex and investigate whether men mobilized at higher levels in
the ‘treated’ localities, that is localities with higher proportion of women. Our
preliminary results using data from Norway before and after suffrage reforms show
that this was not the case men did not turn out in higher numbers in response
to women’s enfranchisement. Further robustness analyses can be run using data
from Chile, Argentina and Germany.
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Table 1: Data & Samples Used in the Analysis
Reform Treatment Locales N Embedded in Redistricting Newly Enfranchised Women
Norway 1909 ∆ ln(electorate) Municipalities 622 Counties* Yes (1 municipality) Tax-payers
Norway 1915 ∆ ln(electorate) Municipalities 660 Counties* Yes (1 municipality) Women who did not pay taxes
UK 1929 ∆ln(registered) Constituencies* 578 Regions No <30 & without property
Canada 1921 ∆ ln(electorate) Ridings* 221 Provinces No No soldier in family
Notes: Star (*) denotes units which refer to electoral constituencies. Units which experienced redistricting during the relevant time
period were excluded from the analyses.
3.3.4 Key Independent Variable: The Intensity of Suffrage
We analyze the effect of women’s enfranchisement on partisan outcomes and po-
litical competition separately for each country in our sample. The unit of analysis
differs by country depending on the level of detail reported in official sources. For
some countries we have access to polling station data, while others report only
higher-level information, for example, constituency level returns (See Table 1).
For each country, we verify that there is a reasonable amount of variation in our
key independent variable – the intensity of the ‘treatment’ of electoral reform –
within each case. Recall that the treatment intensity is measured as the change in
the size of the electorate as a whole. We utilize the (logged) change in electorate
size at the local level. A detailed description of our treatment variables is in Table
1.
Figure 1 presents kernel densities for the treatment variable in each country.
Importantly, we see that the treatment variable varies substantially within each
country. While in some locales the suffrage reforms had smaller impact, in others
the size of the electorate increased considerably. In each case, these changes are
driven by uneven distribution of the newly enfranchised women across locales. The
distributions follow a similar pattern in each country, ranging from just above 0 to
1.8 with an average around 0.5. We find somewhat less variation in the treatment
variable for reforms which enfranchised only some women, such as the second
reforms in the U.K. and Norway.
3.4 Results
We present results on the partisan effect of women’s suffrage for Norway, Canada
and the United Kingdom in this version of the paper. The results are separate
for each country but the presentation follows a similar pattern. For each suffrage
reform, we discuss the historical background and then present baseline results
from regression estimates. Where control variables are available, we include them
in nested versions of the models and show full results in the Appendix.
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Figure 1: Variation in the Treatment Variable (Kernel Densities)
3.4.1 Canada
The first federal reform that enfranchised Canadian women at the federal level
emerged as part of the Wartime Election Act of 1917, which was passed under a
Conservative government in an attempt to manipulate the size of the electorate
in order to increase support for military conscription (Brodie 1991).9 While such
manipulation distorted the electorate for political purposes, it allowed about half
a million women – about 20 percent of adult women – to vote in federal elections
9This was achieved by disenfranchising naturalized citizens before 1902 who were born in
enemy countries, and by enfranchising women who had served in the armed forces or who had
relatives that were soldiers.
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for the first time.
Most Canadian women, however, were enfranchised by the 1920 Dominion
Election Act, which allowed all non-indigenous women to exercise federal-level
voting rights in time for the 1921 election.10 Given that the 1917 reform covered
only a small share of Canadian women, and also disenfranchised some men, it is
difficult to disentangle the effects of the two reforms on electoral outcomes. For
this reason, we only focus on the second reform, in 1920, which enfranchised the
vast majority of women while making only minimal changes to the male electorate.
The suffrage movement in Canada resembled that of its American counterpart.
In both cases, the suffrage movement drew much support from the temperance and
progressive movements. It is therefore not surprising that women were expected to
overwhelmingly support prohibition and, once enfranchised, to ‘clean up’ politics
with social reforms (Bacchi 1983). In general, the Conservatives at the turn of the
century tended to be slightly more supportive of temperance.11
Although it was the Conservative Party that showed a warmer reception to
prohibition and even passed the Dominion Act which enfranchised all women in
federal elections, out of the two major parties, the Liberal Party was far more
receptive to women’s demands at the provincial level, enfranchising women in
seven out of nine provinces (Cleverdon 1950). The Liberals even adopted women’s
suffrage on the federal plank before the Conservatives.
Before the 1921 election, the Liberals chose a party leader who did not support
conscription during the war, nor were the Liberals part of the conservative-lead
Unionist government. The party also proposed to implement a number of labour
reforms, which ranged from health and unemployment insurance to workmen’s
compensations and opposed the protective tariff. The combination of class conflict
and the legacy of the ethno-linguistic conflict over conscription resulted in a strong
regional divide in the 1921 election. While Liberals won the election, their support
outside Quebec was threatened by the agrarian Progressive Party. In Ontario, the
10Canada’s Inuit and Indian peoples were excluded from the franchise until after WWII, and
there were no rights for people of Japanese origin until 1948.
11The Conservatives provided legislative support to provinces which already passed prohibition
and introduced temporary prohibition during the war for efficiency reasons (Blocker et al 2003).
While the Liberals were forced by organized interests to hold a plebiscite on the issue in 1898,
they refrained from implementing any legislation following the popular ‘yes’ vote (Blocker et al
2003).
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Conservative Party received a plurality of votes, while the Liberals in Quebec won
every seat.
Figure 1: Results for Canada
Table 2 presents estimates of the shifts in partisan support that followed after
women’s suffrage in Canada. Table 3 presents results separately for two largest
provinces – Ontario and Quebec. The columns in each table introduce controls
progressively, starting with province effects in the baseline models. The propor-
tion of foreign born population and foreign born population in enemy countries
are also included in the final models within each party block. These controls cap-
ture the size of the population which was affected by changes to male suffrage in
the 1920 reform, which disenfranchised alien soldiers and enfranchised previously
disenfranchised naturalized citizens from enemy countries. Figure 1 below plots
the estimates from models with full controls as presented in Tables 2-3.
After including all controls, women’s votes had a small positive effect on sup-
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port for the Liberal party, although this relationship is significant only at the 10
percent level. For every 10 percent increase in the electorate, the Liberals gained
1.8 percent of votes. Neither the Conservative nor Labour parties were affected
by women’s votes at the federal level. However, a very different picture emerges
once only the two largest provinces are examined. Women in Ontario strongly
preferred the Liberal party, driving the result in the pooled model. Women in
anti-government French-speaking Quebec instead seemed to prefer Labour can-
didates, although this relationship is not statistically significant at conventional
levels.
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Table 2. The Effect of Suffrage on Party Support in Canada (1921-1917)
Dependent Var. ∆ Conservative ∆ Liberal ∆ Labour
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆ ln(Electorate) 0.015 -0.088 -0.078 0.07 0.169 0.179* 0.035 0.04 0.054
(0.109) (0.085) (0.093) (0.089) (0.103) (0.102) (0.074) (0.087) (0.09)
Foreign controls x x Yes x x Yes x x Yes
Province FEs x Yes Yes x Yes Yes x Yes Yes
Obs. 192 192 191 192 192 191 192 192 191
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; uncontested districts
in 1917 are excluded from the analysis (N=31); districts with incomplete data in any election are
excluded (N=18); Labour combines votes for Labour party, Socialist party and Opposition-Labour
party, Conservative combines votes for Conservative party in 1921 and Government party in 1917;
Liberal combines votes for Liberal party in 1921 and Opposition party in 1917; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.001.
Table 3. The Effect of Suffrage by Region in Canada (1921-1917)
Region Ontario
Dependent Var: ∆ Conservative ∆ Liberal ∆ Labour
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln(Electorate) -0.125 -0.124 0.741*** 0.736*** -0.039 -0.033
(0.19) (0.198) (0.148) (0.134) (0.073) (0.078)
Foreign controls x Yes x Yes x Yes
Obs. 80 80 80 80 80 80
Region Quebec
Dependent Variable: ∆ Conservative ∆ Liberal ∆ Labour
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln(Electorate) -0.135 -0.122 0.002 -0.017 0.179 0.181
(0.111) (0.123) (0.084) (0.071) (0.121) (0.123)
Foreign controls x Yes x Yes x Yes
Obs. 46 46 46 46 46 46
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; uncontested
districts in 1917 are excluded from the analysis; districts with incomplete data in any election
are excluded; Labour combines votes for Labour party, Socialist party and Opposition-
Labour party, Conservative combines votes for Conservative party in 1921 and Government
party in 1917; Liberal combines votes for Liberal party in 1921 and Opposition party in
1917; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
3.4.2 Norway
In Norway, women’s enfranchisement followed a two-way process. First, women
who paid taxes were admitted to the parliamentary franchise in 1906 and voted
for the first time in the 1909 election. On June 11, 1913 a paragraph added to the
constitution gave universal suffrage to all citizens over 25 years who had resided
in the country for 5 years. All women thus voted for the first time in the 1915
election. This reform also enfranchised men on poor relief. However, given the
fact that the proportion of men on poor relief was low and can be proxied by the
proportion of votes that were suspended in the previous elections, we analyze the
effects of both reforms. Our sample consists of about 600 municipalities which are
embedded in electoral counties. Only one municipality changed boundaries during
each reform.
The suffrage movement in Norway was an important force, particularly due to
efforts of Labour women. The movement grew on a tide of nationalist sentiment
that was fuelled by the temperance movement. Once the union with Sweden
dissolved in 1905, women demanded suffrage as a reward for their efforts in the
nationalist movement.12 Politically, the socialists and radicals were the driving
force behind suffrage, accepting partial economic suffrage in 1909 despite the fact
that most of their electorate was not affected by the reform (Adams 2014). On the
other hand, the Conservative Party fiercely opposed suffrage, agreeing to partial
economic suffrage for wealthy and middle-class women in their efforts to increase
the support against the rising threat of socialism (Adams 2014). Women’s suffrage,
in their view, was important for concession laws which aimed to control industrial
developments. Since Labour and socialists did not gain legislative power until
after World War One, it was the Liberal party under G. Knudsen that granted
municipal and national suffrage to all women.
While survey data after World War Two show that women supported Conser-
vatives more often than men (Duverger 1955), women’s preferences at the turn
of the century would have been better represented by liberal radicals and social-
ists. For a start, Norwegian Labour Democrats and socialist groups championed
12In anticipation of a plebiscite to dissolve the union with Sweden, the National Woman
Suffrage Association had prepared a petition with 300,000 signatures in support of seceding,
mobilizing nearly all adult women in the country.
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the prohibition cause.13 The Liberal party, although often split on the issue, ini-
tiated a plebiscite on the issue in 1919, attempting to avoid cooperation with
Labour. The Conservative Party, on the other hand, perceived prohibition as a
violation of economic liberties (Derry 1973). In a similar vein, radical liberals
and Labour politicians showed interest in social reforms, seeking to ameliorate
economic hardship and control industrial developments. While Labour remained
underrepresented in the Storting until World War I, the G. Knudsen Liberal gov-
ernment in cooperation with radical Labour Democrats, passed several laws that
improved the lives of women and children at the time of suffrage (Derry 1973).
Figure 2: Results for Norway
Tables 4 and 5 present results from two reforms in Norway. Table 5 also includes
models which control for the proportion of suspended votes in the previous election.
Most of these votes were suspended from voters who were on poor relief and as
such serve as a proxy for the proportion of the newly enfranchised men. Figure
2 presents estimates from models in Tables 4-5 with full controls. While the two
reforms enfranchised women of different socio-economic status, Labour benefitted
from the reform in both cases. For every 10% increase in the electorate, Labour
increased its vote share by about 1.5%. These gains were mainly at the expense
of the conservative block.
13The first temperance societies were established in the 1830s, organizing a staggering 10% of
the population by 1919.
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Table 4. The Effect of Suffrage on Party Support in Norway (1915-
1912)
Dep. Var.: ∆ Labour (%) ∆ Liberal (%) ∆ Cons. (%)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ ln(Electorate) 0.165*** 0.162*** -0.096 -0.092 -0.123** -0.125**
(0.047) (0.046) (0.062) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061)
Susp. Votes x Y x Y x Y
Obs 644 644 644 644 644 644
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; Mu-
nicipalities with neative change were excluded (N=16); Conservative refers to a
coalition of Conservative Party and Liberal Left. Liberal refers to a coalition of
Liberal Party and Labour Democrats; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
Table 5. The Effect of Suffrage on Party Support in Norway (1909-
1906)
Dep. Var.: ∆ Labour(%) ∆ Liberal (%) ∆ Cons. (%)
Model (1) (2) (3)
∆ ln(Electorate) 0.148** -0.148 -0.1
(0.073) (0.104) (0.082)
Obs 609 609 609
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; Mu-
nicipalities with neative change were excluded (N=13); Liberal refers to a coalition
between Liberal Party and Labour Democrats in 1909. These parties often run in
coalition at the municipal level; Conservative refers to a coalition between Conser-
vative Party and Liberal Left in 1909 and Coalition Party - formed by Conservative
Party and Moderate Liberal Party - in 1906; All regressions include a constant; *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
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3.4.3 United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom suffrage was extended to women under two separate pieces
of legislation. Although the 1918 Representation of the People Bill admitted
British women to the electoral registers for the first time, only women over 30
who met minimum property qualifications were allowed to vote in the following
years. At the same time that the 1918 bill expanded the franchise to some women,
it also changed eligibility laws for men and ushered in wholesale re-districting.
This makes the 1918 reform less than ideal for our analysis.
Instead, we consider the effect of the 1928 Representation of the People Act,
which removed the age floor and property requirement making the voting laws
universal in the U.K. for the first time. Although all men and women could vote on
the same terms after 1928, the U.K.’s electoral law still allowed for plural voting,
that is, for owners of multiple residences to vote in the constituencies of each
residence. The 1928 reform enfranchised about five million women, two million
of which were primarily working-class women and thre million who were under 30
years and mostly industrial workers (Joannou and Purvis 1998). Importantly, too,
is the fact that the boundaries of parliamentary constituencies remained the same.
The 1928 reform was presided over by Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, who
led the Tory party from 1923 to 1929. This is curious because the Tories had
generally voted against women’s enfranchisement both when it was presented on
private member bills prior to 1914, and as members of the Speaker’s conference
on electoral reform in 1916. Although the Conservatives led the parliament, the
Tories may have believed their position to be quite vulnerable in 1928. But the
Liberal party did not show a warmer reception to women’s suffrage. For example,
Liberal Lloyd George voted against national suffrage on several occasions before
the war, fearing that ‘it would spell a disaster for liberalism.’ In the end, the
Liberal party was targeted by many suffragists, who instead packed with Labour,
which believed that its support for suffrage would bring women to the party (Teele
2014). Not surprisingly, it was the Labour party which targeted women in the 1929
election, often appealing to their votes ‘for the sake of children.’
Table 6 (and Figure 3 presents estimates which show that the Conservative
party seemed to lose from the reform – larger changes in the electorate between
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Figure 3: Results for United Kingdom
the two elections resulted in lower levels of support for the Tories. Nor was there
any discernible change in the share of voters who supported Labour. On the other
hand, the Liberal party seemed to benefit from the reform: for every 10 percent
increase in the electorate, the Conservatives lost about 3.5 percent of voters, while
the Liberals gained about 2.7 percent. Substantively, the increased support for
the Liberal party in constituencies where the impact of the reform was greatest
may not have been as important as the fall in support for the Tories. Indeed,
the Liberals gained a mere 19 seats while the Labour party picked up 137 seats,
surging to power with 288 MPs over the Tories’ 260.
Table 6. The Effect of Suffrage in the U.K. (1929-1924)
Dep. Var.: ∆ Labour(%) ∆ Liberal (%) ∆ Cons.(%)
Model (1) (2) (3)
∆ ln(Electorate) 0.072 0.277*** -0.355***
(0.048) (0.075) (0.065)
Obs 578 578 578
Notes: All regressions include a constant; Robust standard errors in brackets;
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
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3.5 Robustness
In this section we address three main threats to our estimation strategy that
our results are driven by pre-existing trends, counter-mobilization of men, and
concurrent reforms.
3.5.1 Pre-Existing Trends in Partisan Support
One of the advantages of the difference-in-difference specification is that it holds
unobserved local characteristics fixed. The gravest concern of our identification
strategy is that the estimates might be driven by pre-existing trends. For example,
if partisan support for left parties grew more in locales which were affected by
suffrage the most, our estimates would be biased and inconsistent. To address
this possibility, we run a series of placebo tests where we regress the change in
partisan support prior to the reforms on the key independent variable (difference
in logged electorate). Using this method we can probe to see whether the locales
that were the most affected by the reform were already becoming subject to pre-
existing trends in partisanship than in those locales where the reform was less
consequential. The only country for which we cannot test this assumption is
Canada, where the War Time Election of Act of 1917 not only enfranchised a
small proportion women, but also disenfranchised some men.
We present the results from all other countries in Figure 4. In most cases, the
regressions returned small and insignificant estimates, suggesting that the parallel
trend assumption is reasonable prior to the reforms. There are, however, number
of exceptions. First, the Conservative vote share in the U.K. rose from 1923 to
1924 more in constituencies that would later experience a larger growth in the
electorate after the 1928 reform. On the other hand, the Liberals lost considerably
in places where the reform had a larger impact. In neither case, however, these
trends follow the same direction as the main estimates of the effects of the reform.
This result is therefore consistent with an explanation that women’s votes stopped
the Conservative surge and changed the tides for Liberals. The second exception
is a significant and large estimate for Norway in 1915, where support for the
Liberal party block was growing in municipalities which were most affected by
the reform. Again, these trends are consistent with the explanation that the 1915
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reform stopped a liberal surge and instead, benefitted the Labour party. On the
whole, we conclude that our results are not driven by pre-existing trends, yet furher
analyses must be carried (such as including control variables in all countries) to
achieve more satisfying results.
Figure 4: Placebo Regressions for U.K. and Norway
3.5.2 Men’s Counter-Mobilization
Another concern for our identification strategy is that the partisan effects might
be driven by men’s mobilization in locales most affected by the reforms. Indeed,
some suggest that dominant groups can mobilize at higher levels to suppress the
power of the oppressed groups (Enos 2011, Washington 2006). While we cannot
address this issue for all countries, we can exploit the fact that some authorities
kept voting records separately for women and men at the time of women’s suffrage,
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and look at whether more men turned out to vote in locales with higher numbers of
women. In Table 7 we present results from these analyses in the whole of Norway.
We first regress our treatment variable on male turnout in the first election after
women’s suffrage. We find that locales which were most affected by women’s votes
were also the locales where men voted at the highest levels. However, such results
may be confounded by third factors. In a second set of regressions, we therefore
regress a change in men’s turnout on our treatment variable. In each case, the
initial correlation disappears, indicating that relatively speaking, men were not
more likely to turn out in locales that had higher share of women. We conclude
that at least in Norway, men did not mobilize at higher levels to negate the effect
of women’s votes.
Table 7: The Effect of Suffrage on Men’s Turnout, Norway 1909
Round 1 Round 2 Round 1 Round 2
Dep. Var.: Turnout Turnout ∆ Turnout ∆ Turnout
(men) (men) (men) (men)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln(Electorate) 0.289*** 0.127** -3.258 0.4
(0.064) (0.061) (5.205) (10.105)
Obs 616 375 616 241
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a con-
stant; Municipalities with negative change were excluded (N=16); * p<0.1,
** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
87
3.5.3 Concurrent Reforms as Multiple Treatments
Finally, we have to address the coincidence of other minor reforms that affected the
scope of the male franchise along with the greater extension to women in Norway
and Canada. In Norway, small proportion of men were enfranchised together with
women in the 1915 election. As these men were on poor relief, the positive effect
on Labour after women’s suffrage could be driven by men. In Table 8 we try to
address this possibility by using a proportion of votes that were suspended in the
previous election as a proxy for municipalities which had a high proportion of men
on poor relief. We show that our main results remain unaffected even if we exclude
municipalities with the highest proportion of suspended votes in 1912. Moreover,
we show that the effect of our treatment does not depend on the proportion of
suspended votes.
In Canada, the electorate for the 1917 election was manipulated by the war-time
government to secure their continued power and conscription. In the 1917 election,
all soldiers regardless of nationality were allowed to vote and naturalized citizens
from enemy countries were disenfranchised. These changes were only implemented
for the 1917 election, allowing previously disenfranchised immigrants to vote and
taking the vote from foreign soldiers. These changes mainly affected Western
provinces and parts of Ontario, where the proportion of foreign born citizens was
highest. In Table 9, we therefore restrict our sample to ridings which have seen
only low proportion of foreign born citizens and those who were born in enemy
countries. In each case, our results return comparable estimates regardless of such
exclusions.
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Table 8. Robustness to Concurent Reforms for a 1915 Reform in Norway
Dep. Var.: ∆ Lab. ∆ Lib. ∆ Cons. ∆ Lab. ∆ Lib. ∆ Cons. ∆ Lab. ∆ Lib. ∆ Cons.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆ ln(Electorate) 0.152*** -0.059 -0.159** 0.162*** -0.079 -0.113 0.133** -0.055 -0.142
(0.051) (0.077) (0.078) (0.057) (0.09) (0.089) (0.069) (0.105) (0.108)





Sample <75 Pctl of Suspended (2.7%) <50 Pctl of Suspended (1.8%) All
Obs. 482 482 482 333 333 333 644 644 644
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; Municipalities with neative change were excluded
(N=16); Conservative refers to a coalition of Conservative Party and Liberal Left. Liberal refers to a coalition of Liberal Party
and Labour Democrats; All regressions include a constant; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
Table 9. Canada: Excluding Districts with High Proportion of Foreigners
PANEL A: Excluding Districts with High Proportion of Foreigners.
Ontario Quebec
Dep. Var.: ∆ Cons. ∆ Lib. ∆ Lab. ∆ Cons. ∆ Lib. ∆ Lab. ∆ Cons. ∆ Lib. ∆ Lab.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆ ln(Electorate) -0.137 0.103 0.144 -0.279 0.781** -0.069 -0.133 -0.023 0.185
(0.127) (0.09) (0.113) (0.514) (0.291) (0.081) (0.12) (0.086) (0.125)
Sample <50 Percentile of Foreigners (8%)
Province FEs Yes Yes Yes x x x x x x
Obs. 91 91 91 33 33 33 40 40 40
PANEL B: Excluding Districts with High Proportion of Foreigners from Enemy Countries.
Ontario Quebec
Dep. Var.: ∆ Cons. ∆ Lib. ∆ Lab. ∆ Cons. ∆ Lib. ∆ Lab. ∆ Cons. ∆ Lib. ∆ Lab.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
∆ ln(Electorate) -0.173 0.117 0.149 -0.236 0.72* -0.085 -0.178* 0.046 0.183
(0.117) (0.084) (0.115) (0.705) (0.381) (0.106) (0.095) (0.064) (0.124)
Sample <50 Percentile of Foreigners from Enemy countries (1.6%)
Province FEs Yes Yes Yes x x x x x x
Obs. 92 92 92 28 28 28 44 44 44
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; All regressions include a constant; uncontested districts in 1917 are excluded from the
analysis (N=31); districts with incomplete data in any election are excluded (N=18); Labour combines votes for Labour party,
Socialist party and Opposition-Labour party, Conservative combines votes for Conservative party in 1921 and Government party
in 1917; Liberal combines votes for Liberal party in 1921 and Opposition party in 1917; The exclusion mainly affects Western
provinces, approximately half of Ontario and only lightly Quebec and Maritimes; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.001.
3.6 Conclusion
We have taken a first pass at examining the electoral consequences of women’s
enfranchisement on partisan support. Our review of the existing literature on
women’s political behavior in history reveals three competing theses which predict
women’s voting behavior. While the traditional voting gap thesis stipulates that
women historically supported conservative parties, the distributive politics thesis
implies that women should vote for parties with redistributive agendas. Finally,
women may remain loyal to parties that enfranchised them. Studying electoral
returns in Canada, U.K. and Norway, we suggest that the distributive politics
thesis performs the best.
We find that women’s enfranchisement benefited Labour and Liberal parties.
In Canada, post-war survey data show that women that were socialized during the
hype of women’s movements in the 1920s and 1960s supported parties associated
with women’s welfare and suffrage agendas (Bashevkin 1983). Analyzing the first
election after federal suffrage in 1921, we find that women indeed preferred the
Liberal party at the time of suffrage. In Ontario, women’s preferences for the
rather reformist Liberal party were particularly strong, while women in Quebec
seemed to be more inclined to support Labour. These findings corroborate the
view that women voted for parties which showed warmer reception to women’s
welfare and suffrage.
In the United Kingdom, the post-war survey data frequently show conservative
gender voting gap, although the differences between women and men at that time
remained minimal (Blondel 1963). At the time of the second suffrage reform in
1928, however, we show that the newly enfranchised women supported the Liberal
party. While the reform under study enfranchised women who were below 30
years of age and did not pay taxes in previous elections, the newly enfranchised
women did not support the Labour party, suggesting that the Liberal party won
the contest with Labour over women’s votes.
In Norway, post-war survey data also show a frequent conservative gender vot-
ing gap until the 1980s (Oskarson 1995). Women at the time of suffrage, however,
turned to support Labour. In Norway, radical liberals and Labour politicians were
champions of prohibition, social reforms, as well as women’s suffrage. On the
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other hand, conservatives supported free industry and opposed prohibition as well
as women’s suffrage, unless it affected only wealthy women (Derry 1973).
These findings all point in the same direction: in the three largely Protestant
countries, in constituenties where women dwelled in higher numbers, parties on
the Left performed better. In countries where parties on the political left had
programmatic commitments to temperance, like Norway, women supported them.
In neither country conservatives benefitted from teh reforms. This leads us to cast
doubt on the wholesale validity of the ‘traditional’ voting gap thesis at the time
of women’s suffrage.
The reforms also did not inevitably produce wins for the parties that resided
over the reform, as the Conservatives were in power in both Canada and the U.K.
in the relevant moments. For these reasons, we also reject the utility of the loyalty
thesis for understanding women’s political behavior in these settings. If women
voted on suffrage, they stayed loyal to parties which showed a somewhat warmer
reception to the cause over the long-run, such as in Norway and Canada.
Our hunch, instead, is that women’s economic vulnerability lead to an increase
in welfare spending after female suffrage as previous research suggested because
women’s enfranchisement increased support for parties with redistributive (and
pro-suffrage) programmatic agendas. Although many claimed that extending vot-
ing rights to women does not have major consequences for politics, with these
findings in hand we beg to differ.
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4 Universal Suffrage and the Electoral Support
for Parties with Redistributive Agendas: Evi-
dence from Sixteen Countries
Abstract
This research examines the effects of suffrage on partisan support. While
the economic theory suggests that suffrage increases welfare spending via
party convergence on the new median, this paper shows that parties with
redistributive agendas were the main beneficiaries of the reforms. Analyzing
data from sixteen countries for the period 1880-1975, this research shows
that male suffrage correlates positively with Socialist support. The effect
of female suffrage depends on Catholicism and the female labour force. In
Catholic countries, Socialist support was reduced in favour of the Christian
Democrats, particularly when the proportion of women in the paid workforce
was low. In Protestant countries, female suffrage boosted Socialist support,
particularly when the female labour force was at its largest.
93
4.1 Introduction and Overwiew
One of the most important aspects of democratization in the West was the expan-
sion of suffrage to lower-class men and to women. But the effects of suffrage reforms
went beyond increased political equality among citizens. In fact, the rise of the
welfare state could not be understood without acknowledging the importance of de-
mocratization efforts since the early nineteenth century (Acemoglu and Robinson
2000; Boix 2003). Indeed, ample empirical evidence documents the link between
suffrage and redistribution for both male and female reforms (Aidt, Dutta and
Loukoianova 2006; Husted and Kenny 1997; Lott and Kenny 1999; Miller 2008).
The prevailing explanation for the redistributive effects of suffrage relies on the
electoral model, where all parties converge on the new - more pro-redistributive -
median (Meltzer and Richard 1981). It follows that neither political party should
benefit from the votes of the newly enfranchised voters. Yet this prediction has
not been subjected to systematic empirical tests.
Moreover, ample evidence contradicts the notion that suffrage had no effect on
partisan support. Not only was the electoral support for early Socialists among
working-class men substantial, but the Socialists also represented distinct pref-
erences of the newly emerged industrial working class (Bartolini 2007, 122-180;
Przeworski and Sprague 1986; Von Beyme 1985, 248-293). It has also been es-
tablished that the rise of the welfare state was associated with the strength of
Socialist parties (Blais, Blake and Dion 1993; Huber and Stephens 2000). Yet
the most recent empirical studies struggle to find an immediate positive effect of
male suffrage on the support of left parties (Berlinski and Dewan 2011; Larcinese
2014). The fact that neither of these studies examines long-term effects of the
reforms might be of particular importance, since the working-class men mobilized
only gradually (Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova 2006; Przeworski and Sprague 1986,
63). Exploiting spatial and temporal variation in suffrage reforms, I show that the
support for Socialist parties correlates with universal male suffrage in the long run.
Such finding supports the notion that the newly enfranchised poor men voted for
the Socialist parties, which in turn helped to drive the rise of the welfare state.
It directly contradicts the prediction of the electoral model that the rise of the
welfare state after suffrage reforms was driven equally by all political parties.
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A great deal of anecdotal evidence also contradicts the prediction of the elec-
toral model for the effects of female suffrage on partisan outcomes. It has been
well established that in Catholic countries women strongly preferred Christian
Democratic parties (Duverger 1955, 50-67; Tingsten 1937, 36-78). Conveniently
for women, the family-friendly policies of the Christian Democrats appealed not
only to women’s welfare preferences, but also to their socially conservative and
religious preferences (Norris 1988; Randall 1987; Van Kersbergen 1991, 136-147).
In the absence of Christian Democratic parties, however, women had to choose be-
tween their welfare and socially conservative, religious preferences, favouring the
former in the long run. As the women in Protestant countries entered the paid
workforce, they turned to the Socialists (Huber and Stephens 2000; Przeworski
2009, 313-318). Once employed, women not only developed positive attitudes to-
wards better health, education and welfare services, they were also successfully
mobilized by the Socialist parties on their need for state-funded relief from their
caregiving responsibilities (Huber and Stephens 2000; Manza and Brooks 1998;
Wilensky 1990). It follows that the examination of the long-term effects of female
suffrage on partisan support is of the utmost importance. Exploiting the rich spa-
tial and temporal variation in suffrage reforms, this study shows that, contrary
to the electoral model, female suffrage increases electoral support for parties with
redistributive agendas. In Catholic countries, female suffrage increases Christian
Democratic support at the expense of the Socialists, particularly when the female
labour force is small. In Protestant countries, female suffrage positively correlates
with electoral support for the Socialists in the long run, particularly when the
female labour force is at its largest.
This study analyzes data from sixteen Western countries and covers the period
from 1880 to 1975. I apply a fixed effects model and show that the results are
robust to the inclusion of lagged dependent variable. I also show that the results
are robust to various specifications. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
The next section discusses related literature and formulates two main hypotheses.
The third section presents the data and discusses relevant facts and descriptive
statistics. The fourth section provides a detailed account of the identification
strategy, and the fifth section presents the main results and robustness checks.
The last section makes final remarks.
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4.2 Related Literature and Hypotheses
4.2.1 Men’s Suffrage
When most Socialist parties were founded at the end of the nineteenth century,
a substantial proportion of their natural electorate was still disenfranchised. If
the Socialists were to come to power, the revolution would need to come from the
inside. Once all men had the right to vote, the electoral victory of Socialism seemed
to be only a matter of time. As Przeworski and Sprague (1986) pointed out, the
ballots became the ‘paper stones’ of the raging proletariat. The evidence suggests
that support for early Socialists among working-class men was indeed considerable
(Tingsten 1937, 120-181; Von Beyme 1985, 284-293; Przeworski and Sprague 1986;
Bartolini 2007, 122-180). For example, Tingsten (1937, 126-127) reports electoral
statistics from cantonal elections in Basel-Stadt and Zurich in 1911 and 1933,
respectively. He finds a very strong correlation between the strength of the working
class and the Social Democratic party, with most districts showing almost identical
proportions for the two.
However, recent studies which examine the effects of male suffrage on partisan
outcomes cease to provide systematic evidence. Berlinski and Dewan (2011) use
evidence from the Second Reform Act in Britain and test the effects of male suffrage
on the subsequent victory of the Liberal party in Britain in 1868. Although the
authors find that the reform increased political competition, they conclude that the
victory of the Liberal party was incidental to the reform. Similarly, while Larcinese
(2014) finds that the level of enfranchisement in Italy in 1913 was associated with
an increase in electoral support for reformist parties (Liberals and Socialists), he
finds no effect of male suffrage on the parliamentary representation of the reformist
parties. He concludes that the elite successfully attempted to neutralize the full
effect of the reform.
The economic literature, in turn, finds strong evidence that the adoption of
male suffrage was followed by an increase in redistribution. In the U.S., Husted
and Kenny (1997) provided evidence that the elimination of poll tax and literacy
tests increased welfare spending. In Europe, Aidt et al. (2006) found that gradual
lifting of economic restrictions on male suffrage was associated with a growth in
spending on security, public services, and the total size of the government. In
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Latin America, Aidt and Eterovic (2011) found that governmental expansion was
associated with the elimination of literacy requirements. Most of these studies
relied on the theoretical prediction of the Meltzer and Richard model, which pre-
dicts an increase in redistribution after the expansion of the electorate to poorer
citizens (Meltzer and Richard 1981). As the median voter gets poorer, political
parties converge on the new poorer median and deliver greater redistribution. As
such, the electoral model predicts that no political party should benefit from the
enlargement of the electorate, not even the Socialists.
The anecdotal evidence for the support of Socialist parties among the working-
class electorate, however, should not be ignored. Moreover, some studies suggest
that, contrary to the electoral model, political parties may help to mediate the
redistributive effects of the suffrage. For example, Kroth et al. (2015) showed
that not only did enfranchisement of the black population improve the delivery
of public services in South Africa, but that this effect was strongest in the core
ANC constituencies. Furthermore, neither of the existing studies examined the
long-term effects of male suffrage. This might be particularly important, given the
fact that both Berlinski and Dewan (2011), and Larcinese (2014) report that in
the first election after the extension of suffrage voter turnout declined. In fact,
the decline in voter turnout after suffrage is well documented (Aidt, Dutta and
Loukoianova 2006; Aidt and Dallal 2008; Bartolini 2007, 221-225; Przeworski and
Sprague 1986, 63). This study therefore exploits spatial and temporal variation
in the adoption of universal male suffrage and estimates the long-term effects of
male suffrage on Socialist electoral support.
Hypothesis 1: Universal male suffrage, which extends the franchise to
most working-class men, increases the support for Socialist parties in
the long term.
4.2.2 Women’s Suffrage
Whereas male suffrage was generally extended gradually from middle-class men to
working-class men, women were mostly enfranchised in one fell swoop. As such, fe-
male suffrage could have an effect on partisan support only if women’s preferences
were on average distinct from those of men. Indeed, the economic experimental
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literature shows that women exhibit more pro-redistributive preferences (Alesina
and Giuliano 2009). More importantly, women’s suffrage has been convincingly
linked to the rise of the welfare state. Analysing cross-time, cross-country data,
Lindert (1994) identifies a positive association between female suffrage and welfare
spending. Bertocchi (2011), in turn, finds that the redistributive effect of female
suffrage was exclusive to Protestant countries owing to the high costs of disenfran-
chisement. In the U.S., Lott and Kenny (1999) exploited the fact that suffrage
reforms were forced on some states by the Nineteenth Amendment and found that
female suffrage had positive effect on the size of the government. Others link
the Nineteenth Amendment to higher levels of spending on education and local
spending on health and child mortality (Miller 2008). In Europe, Abrams and
Settle (1999) exploited the fact that Switzerland extended the vote to women long
after neighbouring countries and showed that the newly enfranchised women in-
creased welfare spending in Switzerland. Funk and Gathmann (2010) found large
gender voting gaps on the preferences for the composition of public spending in
Switzerland. Finally, analyses of historical data from Europe further confirms the
positive association between female suffrage and social spending, particularly after
controlling for the gradual mobilization of women (Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova
2006; Aidt and Dallal 2008).
Most of these studies, however, relied explicitly or implicitly on the electoral
model, which predicts that parties respond to the change in the preference of the
median voter. According to this logic, no party should attract more votes from the
newly enfranchised women than any other. Although it is true that some scholars
suggest that women, by and large, cast the same ballot as their husbands (Duverger
1955, 46-49), or that women’s distinct preferences were not captured by political
parties until more recently (Clart and Clark 2008, 2; Manza and Brooks 1998),
most argue that women’s socially conservative and religious values led them to vote
for the conservative parties until the 1980s, when they realigned to the political
left (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef and Lin. 2004; Edlund and Pande 2002; Inglehart
and Norris 2000; Norris 1988; Randall 1987).
But how could the newly enfranchised women of the early twentieth century
vote for conservative parties, as the political science literature argues, and at the
same time prefer higher levels of redistribution, as the economic literature ar-
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gues? An immediate explanation would suggest that in the early twentieth century
women held both welfare and socially conservative preferences, although parties
successfully converged only on the former set of preferences. According to this ac-
count, all parties successfully targeted women’s welfare preferences, so that women
voted solely on their conservative and religious preferences. However, ample ev-
idence shows that political parties did not successfully converge on the welfare
issue, with Socialists and Christian Democrats clearly offering and delivering bet-
ter welfare platforms (Huber and Stephens 2000; Van Kersbergen 1991). In fact,
quite conveniently for women, Christian Democratic parties represented women’s
socially conservative and religious as well as their welfare preferences. Clearly in-
fluenced by social Catholicism, Christian Democratic parties endorsed distinctive
welfare programmes which allowed them to capture the votes of both lower- and
upper-class Catholics. As such, the Christian Democratic welfare state supported
families with substantial tax, wage and benefit systems, generally incentivizing
women to work at home (Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993; Van Kersbergen 1991,
100-113).
It is therefore hardly a coincidence that ample anecdotal evidence suggests
that Christian Democratic parties successfully captured women’s votes in Catholic
countries. For example, many have documented the traditionally sex-distinctive
base of Christian Democrats across all classes in Italy (Van Kersbergen 1991, 67-
68). The survey data revealed that in 1968 Italian women preferred the Christian
Democratic Party by a staggering 24 per cent (Barnes 1974, 192). The evidence
from separate ballots in Germany shows that whereas Catholic Zentrum/CDU re-
ceived 89 per cent more votes from women in both the 1920 and 1953 elections,
the difference was 1520 per cent in the most Catholic districts (Duverger 1955,
52-67; Tingsten 1937, 37-65). In Belgium, the post-war size of the gender gap
at the national level was estimated at 7 per cent for the Christian Democrats,
although it was likely driven by the Catholic region (Hill 1974, 92-94). Conse-
quently, Przeworski (2009, 313-318) links women’s relatively late enfranchisement
to their alignment with Christian Democrats in Catholic countries.
In the absence of Christian Democratic parties, however, women had to choose
between their welfare and their socially conservative and religious preferences.
While some argue that women voted mainly on their socially conservative and re-
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ligious preferences in both Protestant and Catholic countries (Norris 1988; Randall
1987), others argue that women’s left-leaning preferences in Protestant countries
allowed the left parties in power to enfranchise women without much hesitation
(Przeworski 2009, 313-318). The evidence as to whether women preferred Conser-
vative over Socialist parties in Protestant countries is inconclusive. The available
evidence from separate ballots and first survey data shows that whereas Protestant
women preferred Conservative parties more often than Socialists, the gender gap
rarely exceeded more than a few percentage points (Duverger 1955, 122; Tingsten
1937, 36-78). It has also been suggested that whenever women were found to pre-
fer Conservative parties in Protestant countries, the gap may have been driven by
low turnout among working-class women. For example, using data from Stock-
holm and Germany, Tingsten (1937, 62) concludes that the low participation rate
of working-class women (especially household servants and shop assistants) may
‘explain why the more conservative movements have been favoured by women’s
suffrage’. Similarly, the economic literature estimates that women’s voter turnout
reached men’s levels only with a substantial time lag (Lott and Kenny 1999; Aidt
and Dallal 2008). As such, the estimation of long-term effects of female suffrage
on partisan outcomes in Protestant countries is of the utmost importance. As
the mobilization of working-class women reaches men’s turnout levels, we should
expect women in Protestant countries to move away from the Conservative parties.
Moreover, in the absence of generous family policies, poor and middle-class
women must enter paid employment. And once women enter the workforce, not
only do they develop positive attitudes towards better health, education and wel-
fare services, they also seek relief from their caregiving responsibilities (Wilen-
sky 1990). With the Socialists gradually responding to these demands, it has
been argued that the newly mobilized women align with the Socialists (Huber and
Stephens 2000). In the US, Manza and Brooks (1998) show that the rise in the
female labour force was responsible for women’s realignment to the Democratic
Party. It follows that women’s tendency to support the Socialists in Protestant
countries may be jointly conditional on the absence of Christian Democratic parties
(and Catholicism) and on the high proportion of women in the workforce. The
Socialists can capture the votes of the (gradually) mobilized women in Protes-
tant countries only if the female labour force is sufficiently great. Wherever the
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proportion of women in the workforce in Protestant countries is lower, once the
newly enfranchised women mobilize fully, the Socialists may not fully succeed in
capturing their votes.
Quite surprisingly, Huber and Stephens (2000) show that the number of women
in paid employment promotes welfare spending regardless of the politico- insti-
tutional context - even in Catholic countries with strong Christian Democratic
parties. They argue that both Socialist and Christian Democratic parties seek
women’s votes and therefore respond to women’s welfare preferences. As such,
the Christian Democratic appeal to women in Catholic countries may also be con-
ditional on the female labour force. Female suffrage in Catholic countries may
reduce the support for Socialists in favour of the Christian Democrats, but only if
the proportion of women in paid employment is low. If the proportion of women
in the workforce is sufficiently high, the Socialist version of the welfare state may
be able to compete with the family-friendly policies of the Christian Democrats in
Catholic countries.
Hypothesis 2: Universal female suffrage increases the support for So-
cialist parties in Protestant countries in the long term. The effect
should be greatest in countries with the largest female labour force. In
Catholic countries, universal female suffrage reduces support for the
Socialist parties (and increases the support for Christian Democratic
parties). This effect is mitigated if the female labour force is sufficiently
large.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data set consists of sixteen Western countries, listed in Table 1. The compila-
tion of the sample was based on three exclusion criteria. First, all countries with
simultaneous introduction of female and male universal suffrage were excluded
from the analysis.1 Whenever both women and men were enfranchised at the
same time, it would not be possible to separate the effect of women’s and men’s
1This criterion excludes Malta, Finland, Luxembourg, Iceland and Portugal. Female suffrage
extensions in Denmark and Sweden which occurred together with minor male extensions (men
on public relief) are included in the analysis. However, the robustness analyses show that the
results remain intact even after exclusion of these two countries from the sample.
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votes on partisan outcomes. Second, universal suffrage adoptions which occurred
gradually at the federal level are not included in the analysis.2 Third, universal
suffrage adoptions which occurred before the establishment of Socialist parties are
not included in the analysis.3
The time periods covered for each country are listed in Table 1. Autocratic
regimes with long periods without elections are excluded from the panel, mainly
Italy 1922-1945, Germany 1934-1948, Austria 1938-1944, Greece after 1967, and
Spain 1924-1930 and after 1936. The analysis covers the time period from 1880
until 1975. However, Ireland enters the data set in 1922 with the establishment of
the Irish Republic and Australia in 1901 with the establishment of the federation.
Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria and Greece enter the data set after
1880 owing to missing or unavailable electoral data for relevant periods. All data
collected prior to the establishment of the First Austrian Republic in 1919 refers
to the approximate land area of modern Austria under Austria-Hungary.
4.3.1 Universal Suffrage
Franchise reforms generally included rich men before poor men, and men before
women. Table 1 lists the electoral year when suffrage was first applied. Uni-
versal male suffrage was adopted in some countries as early as the first half of
the nineteenth century, although the crucial period for male suffrage is generally
dated roughly between 1880 and 1920. The earliest adoptions occurred in Greece,
Switzerland, France and Denmark in the first half of the nineteenth century, fol-
lowed by reforms in Spain and Germany. While some states in Australia and
Canada adopted universal male suffrage long before most of Europe, unified uni-
versal male suffrage at the federal level was adopted around the turn of the century,
along with Belgium, Austria, Norway, Sweden and Italy. Men in the UK, Ireland
and the Netherlands, however, had to wait for the universal vote until after World
2This criterion excludes the United States and male suffrage reforms in Canada and Australia.
Female suffrage adoptions in Canada, Australia and Switzerland are included in the analysis since
women gained voting rights in national elections at federal level with single legislation, despite
the fact that some women were allowed to vote in some parts in lower elections prior to the
adoption of female suffrage
3This excludes New Zealand from the sample and six universal male adoptions. The second
adoption of universal male suffrage in Spain in 1891, which occurred after the establishment of
Socialist parties, however, is included in the analysis
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War One. Women never obtained full voting rights before men. Most women
were granted the right to vote following World War One (Denmark, Germany,
Austria, Sweden, Canada, Netherlands and Ireland) or World War Two (France,
Italy, Belgium). Australia and Norway adopted universal female suffrage prior to
World War One, while Spain and the U.K. granted women full voting rights in the
interwar period. The latest female extensions occurred in Greece and Switzerland.
4.3.2 Socialist Parties
Table 1 lists the main Socialist party for each country and the year when it was
founded and entered the election. The years in parentheses refer to the first appear-
ance of Socialist parties or candidates with Socialist labels, often long preceding
the formation of the main Socialist party. Most Socialist parties were established
in the 1880s, with a few forming as early as the late 1870s, such as in Denmark,
Spain and Germany. Socialist parties which were formed after 1890 were generally
preceded by Socialist candidates, parties or organizations established along with
the rest of Europe in the 1870s and 1880s. However, Socialist candidates did not
emerge in Canada until 1900 and until 1920 in Greece.
Figure 1 plots the electoral support for the Socialist party family by year and
country. The solid black line shows the total electoral support for all parties that
belonged to the Socialist party family. For comparison, the solid grey line in
Graph 1 summarizes the Christian Democratic family and the dashed black line
the electoral support for the Communist family. In most countries, the support
for Socialists rose rapidly until the 1930s with a gradual mobilization of workers
(Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 163). In most cases, when Socialists reached their
maximum, their support stabilized and started declining in the 1960s. The support
for Socialists in Northern Europe, however, continued rising up to the 1950s, while
the Socialists in Canada, Greece and Spain did not emerge until after 1920s.
Upon closer examination of Socialist vote shares and the adoption of universal
male suffrage as displayed in Figure 1, it becomes apparent that the Socialist rise
generally followed or coincided with the adoption of universal male suffrage, often
producing notable jumps in their support. The immediate effects of male suffrage
are apparent in Norway, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Belgium and Austria. The
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Figure 1: Socialist, Communist and Christian Democratic Parties,
1880-1975.
Notes: The solid black line shows the total electoral support for all parties that
belonged to the Socialist party family. The solid grey line summarizes the Chris-
tian Democratic family and the dashed black line the electoral support for the
Communist family. The solid vertical line depicts the adoption of universal male
suffrage and the dashed vertical line the adoption of universal female suffrage.
Sources: Mackie and Rose 1982; Eley 2002; Nohlen and Stover 2010; Flora 1983;
Caramani 2000; Von Beyme 1985
most notable effects are evident in Belgium and Austria, where the support for
Socialists rose from almost zero to 22 per cent and 28 per cent respectively.4 The
increase in Socialist support in the Netherlands seems to be more modest, although
this should not be surprising, given that the suffrage was extended more gradually,
with a generous economic reform granted in 1897, which again seems to coincide
4It must be noted that the vote shares for Socialists in Austria until 1907 differ substantially
from the Socialist seat shares due to a very restrictive curial system, which allocated dispropor-
tionally low number of seats to the fifth (general) curia. The establishment of the fifth curia in
1897 can nonetheless be seen as the introduction of universal male suffrage since all men had a
right to cast a vote in this curia. As such, all votes cast in the fifth curia reflect the strength of
all parties among all electorate, despite the fact that the distribution of power in the parliament
did not reflect these votes until 1907.
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with the rise in Socialist support. The only countries that do not show a clear
correlation between male suffrage and Socialist support are Italy, where Socialists
reached almost 20 per cent despite the fact that only about a quarter of all Italian
men had the right to vote, and Spain, where the Socialist party was established but
did not enter the election until long after the adoption of universal male suffrage.
Figure 2: Average Female Labour Force by Catholicism, 1880-1975.
Sources: Delacroix and Nielsen 2001; Flora 1983; Maoz and Henderson 2013;
Mitchell 2007
Universal female suffrage, on the other hand, does not show a clear one-way
association with Socialist support. While female suffrage appears to contribute to
the rise of Socialists in some countries, in others the Socialist vote share seems
to decrease or show no effect. Protestant Norway and Australia show the largest
immediate increase after adoption of universal female suffrage, whereas Catholic
Ireland shows the largest immediate decrease in the Socialist support. Socialists
in Austria, with its high proportion of Catholics but also a large female labour
force, on the other hand, seem to benefit immediately from the female vote. If
Catholicism and the female labour force, however, are jointly to explain the ef-
fects of female suffrage, it is important that they are not positively correlated.
Figure 2 plots the average share of Catholics on the average female labour force
and shows that the two variables do not exhibit a clear relationship. While pre-
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dominantly Protestant countries show relatively large female labour forces, mixed
or predominantly Catholic countries show both relatively large and small female
labour forces.
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Table 1: Socialist Parties and Universal Suffrage
Main Socialist party#
Country Data Male suffrage* Female suffrage* Established First election
Australia 1901-1975 1900 1903 ALP 1908 (1901) 1910 (1901)
Austria 1891-1975 1897 (A-H) 1919 SDAP 1889 1891
Belgium 1880-1975 1894 1949 PBO 1885 1894
Canada 1880-1975 1917 1921 CCF 1932 (1900) 1935 (1900)
Denmark 1880-1975 1849 1918 SDF 1876 1884
France 1880-1975 1852 1945 SFIO 1905 (1879) 1906 (1881)
Germany 1880-1975 1871 1919 SPD 1875 (1863) 1875 (1871)
Greece 1926-1975 1822 1956 Various 1920 1923
Ireland 1922-1975 1918 (UK) 1923 ILP 1912 (1881 UK) 1922 (1895 UK)
Italy 1880-1975 1913 1946 PSI 1892 (1877) 1895 (1882)
Netherlands 1888-1975 1918 1922 SDAP 1894 (1881) 1894 (1888)
Norway 1880-1975 1900 1915 DNA 1887 1894
Spain 1880-1936 1891 1933 PSOE 1879 1910
Sweden 1887-1975 1911 1921 SAP 1889 1902
Switzerland 1881-1975 1848 1971 SPS 1887 1887
United Kingdom 1880-1975 1918 1929 LP 1900 (1881) 1900 (1895)
* Columns give years when first election under universal suffrage took place. In countries where universal suffrage was
adopted multiple times, only the latest adoptions are reported.
# The years in brackets refer to the first appearance of Socialist parties or candidates with Socialist labels.
Sources: Caramani 2000; Eley 2002; Flora 1983; Mackie and Rose 1982; Nohlen and Stver 2010; Von Beyme 1985
4.4 Empirical Strategy and Variables
Exploiting spatial and temporal variation in the timing of both female and male
suffrage, I estimate a fixed effects model to capture the effect of suffrage on partisan
support of Socialist parties. Specifically, for country i and year t, I estimate the
following equation:
SOCit = α + γi + λt + δSUFit + βX
′
it + it (3)
where SOCit is the outcome variable of interest measured as a percentage of votes
for Socialist parties in country i and year t, SUFit is an indicator for suffrage and
it is an error term. The parameter of interest is δ. Country fixed effects γi remove
unobserved country effects that are constant over time and five year fixed effects λt
capture common shocks to Socialist support in all countries. A vector of observed
socio-economic and political controls X ′it captures the effects of observed time-
varying confounders. The estimated standard errors are panel corrected standard
errors (PCSEs) which are robust to heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous corre-
lation across panels. The PSCEs are combined with Prais-Winsten transformation
to correct for first-order (ar-1) correlation in the residuals.
Second, I estimate the following lagged dependent variable model, where SOCit−1
denotes lagged dependent variable.
SOCit = α + γi + λt + δSUFit + βX
′
it + SOCit−1θ + it (4)
The equation (2) estimates panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs), while the
lagged dependent variable removes serial correlation. This specification also allows
for the separation of the short- and long-run effects of suffrage reforms on partisan
support. This may be particularly important, given that previous research has
shown that voter turnout drops substantially after franchise extension.
A note of caution should be sounded with respect to the interpretation of
the results. The empirical strategy assumes that the timing of the suffrage is
exogenous. If, for example, the decision to extend the franchise was more likely in
countries where Socialist support grew more rapidly, the effects of the reform could
be exaggerated. This is of particular concern for male suffrage, as Socialist parties
and the strength of the working masses were major forces in suffrage extensions.
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With respect to women’s voting rights, these concerns might be lessened, given
that most female suffrage reforms were adopted after exogenous events such as
World War One and World War Two.
4.4.1 Dependent Variables
The main dependent variable is the total vote share for the Socialist party family.
All Socialist parties contribute to the total vote share of the Socialist party family. I
also examine the effects of suffrage on the Christian Democratic party family and
left (Communist and Socialist) party families. The electoral data were sourced
mainly from Caramani (2000), Mackie and Rose (1982) and Nohlen and Stover
(2010). The parties were classified into partisan families according to the data
presented in Von Beyme (1985), Caramani (2000, 20004), Mackie and Rose (1982)
and Volkens et al.(2014).
4.4.2 Key Independent Variable
I define the measure of suffrage in several ways. First I use a continuous measure
as a percentage of the enfranchised population over 20 years of age. While this
measure takes into account the size of the enfranchisement and captures multiple
waves of franchise reforms, it cannot produce separate estimates for male and
female suffrage. Unfortunately, separate continuous measures for female and male
suffrage are not available. In estimating the effects of male suffrage, I therefore
use the available data, which record the percentage of the enfranchised male adult
population until female suffrage and a joint percentage of the enfranchised adult
female and male population after female suffrage. I then control for female suffrage
with a single dummy variable. In estimating the effects of female suffrage, the
main results rely on a separate dummy variable coded 1 after female suffrage
and 0 otherwise. Given that most countries enfranchised all women with a single
reform, a dummy indicator of universal female suffrage captures the similar extent
of the reforms across all countries under study.5 In testing the second hypothesis,
I interact the female dummy with the percentage of Catholics and the percentage
5However, women in the U.K., Ireland and Norway were enfranchised by two separate reforms,
allowing for substantial pre-treatment franchise levels in these countries. At worst, this could
lead to an underestimation of the effects.
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of women in the workforce. Data on suffrage levels and reforms were taken from
Mackie and Rose (1982), Flora (1983) and Caramani (2000).
4.4.3 Control Variables
All regressions include a vector of political and socio-economic control variables.
With respect to political controls, all regressions include a dummy indicator of
proportional representation (PR). While PR could have been adopted as a re-
sponse to the rising left it has also been linked to the success of the left parties
and higher redistribution (Boix 1999; Iversen and Soskice 2006; Rokkan 1970; Per-
son and Tabellini 1999). All regressions also include a measure of voter turnout.
It has been well documented that voter turnout tends to drop after suffrage re-
forms, which could potentially reduce or mitigate the immediate effects of the
reforms (Aidt, Dutta and Loukoianova 2006; Aidt and Dallal 2008; Bartolini 2007,
221-225; Przeworski and Sprague 1986, 63). The polity index is included in all
regressions and controls for the overall level of democracy as well as helping to ac-
count for democratization reforms other than franchise extensions, such as partial
suffrage extensions. Finally, all regressions control for electoral support for Chris-
tian Democratic and Communist partisan families. Both Christian Democrats and
Communists were stronger in Catholic countries and their redistributive agenda
may have provided an alternative to the Socialist platform.6 Data for PR adoption
are sourced from Caramani (2000) and Mackie and Rose (1982). Data for voter
turnout are sourced from Flora (1983) or calculated based on electoral returns in
Mackie and Rose (1982). Marshall et al. provide data for the Polity index.
With respect to socio-economic variables, all regressions attempt to capture the
size of the Socialist and Christian Democratic electorate. All models control for
the percentage of workers in industry, the percentage of workers in agriculture, the
percentage of the population aged above 65 years, the proportion of the population
living in cities with more than 25,000 inhabitants, the percentage of Catholics, and
the percentage of women in the workforce. Finally, all regressions control for overall
economic development with a natural logarithm of GDP per capita in constant
6The inclusion of variables that are themselves potential outcomes may bias the estimates
(King 2010). I therefore replicate the results without these controls and show that, substantive
interpretation remains the same regardless of whether these controls are included in the analysis.
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international dollars. Data for all socio-economic indicators are taken from Banks
(2001), Flora (1983) and Mitchell (2007) and generally present data from national
censuses. Census data are always linearly interpolated. Data on GDP are sourced
from Maddison (2003) and data on Catholicism are from Delacroix and Nielsen
(2001), Flora (1983) and Maoz and Henderson (2013).
4.5 Results
The main results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents estimates of equa-
tion (1). Estimates of the lagged specification of equation (2) are shown in Table 3.
The first columns in Tables 2 and 3 show the effect of a single continuous measure
of the level of enfranchisement, jointly measuring the effect of female and male
suffrage. The effect is positive and highly statistically significant. After control-
ling for all covariates, every one per cent increase in the enfranchised population
over 20 years increases the Socialist vote share by 0.097 per cent. This means
that suffrage reform which enfranchises a quarter of the adult population, that is
abot half of all men, leads on average to about a 2.4 per cent increase in Socialist
electoral support. After adding a lagged dependent variable, the effect remains
positive and significant at the 1 per cent level. Perhaps not surprisingly, the effect
of the level of enfranchisement appears only over time. Enfranchising 25 per cent
of the adult population increases Socialist support by about 0.5 per cent in the
short run to 3.5 per cent in the long run.7
The hypotheses formulated above, however, suggest that the effect of suffrage
should differ for male and female reforms. In testing the effects of male suffrage,
a continuous indicator is available. It records the percentage of the adult male
population with a vote in a given year until female suffrage and the percentage of
the adult population with a vote in a given year after female suffrage. The Model
(2) in Tables 2 and 3 therefore includes the available continuous measure together
with a female dummy. Again, the effect is significant at 1 per cent, even in the
lagged specification. Enfranchising half of the male population leads to a 6 per
cent increase in Socialist support. This effect increases from 1.2 per cent in the
7The long-run effect is calculated as β/(1−θ), where β is the estimated coefficient on suffrage
reform and θ is the estimated coefficient on lagged dependent variable
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short run to 8.4 per cent in the long run.
Table 2: The Effect of Suffrage on Socialist Vote Shares in Sixteen
Countries, 1880-1975
Dependent Var.: Socialist Vote Share
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enfr. popul. (%) 0.097***
(0.015)
M. suff. (cont.) 0.12***
(0.015)
M. suff. (dum.) 7.047*** 6.764*** 7.275***
(0.876) (0.865) (0.877)
F. suff. (dum.) 0.876 1.029 4.875*** -5.802**
(0.7) (0.69) (0.908) (2.367)
Catholics (%) -0.065 -0.131 -0.095 -0.19 -0.047
(0.15) (0.148) (0.146) (0.149) (0.148)
F. labour (%) -0.207* -0.083 -0.175 -0.224* -0.314**
(0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.118) (0.125)
F. suff.*Cath. -0.091***
(0.017)
F. suff.*F. lab 0.251***
(0.083)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Five years FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in
brackets; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agri-
cultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity, Com-
munist Vote Share (%), Christian Democratic Vote Share (% ); *** significant at
1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
A continuous separate measure for both male and female suffrage is not avail-
able. The Models (3-5) in Tables 2 and 3 therefore estimate the effects of two
dummy variables coded 1 if the country allowed universal male or female suffrage
and 0 otherwise. This means that these estimates compare the mean pre-suffrage
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Table 3: The Effect of Suffrage on Socialist Vote Shares in Sixteen
Countries, 1880-1975, Lagged Specification
Dependent Var.: Socialist Vote Share
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enfr. pop. (%) 0.018***
(0.006)
M. suff. (cont.) 0.023***
(0.006)
M. suff. (dum) 1.05*** 1.009*** 1.173***
(0.331) (0.331) (0.347)
F. suff. (dum.) -0.031 -0.025 0.563 -1.333
(0.34) (0.342) (0.388) (1.06)
Catholics (%) -0.061 -0.079* -0.069 -0.098** -0.057
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044)
F. labour (%) -0.038 -0.01 -0.027 -0.031 -0.056
(0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.037)
F. suff.*Cath. -0.016**
(0.007)
F. suff.*F. lab. 0.048
(0.037)
Lagged End. 0.873*** 0.863*** 0.871*** 0.858*** 0.898***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Five years FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in
brackets; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agri-
cultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity, Com-
munist Vote Share (%), Christian Democratic Vote Share (% ); *** significant at
1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
support to the mean post-suffrage support, after controlling for all covariates.
Since some countries, mainly the U.K. and The Netherlands, implemented a gen-
erous franchise that enfranchised some working-class men before the adoption of
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universal male suffrage, the dummy indicators may underestimate the full effects
of the universal reforms. The estimate using a male dummy in Model (3) (Tables 2
and 3), however, is positive, strongly significant, and its magnitude is comparable
to the estimates using the continuous measure. Since most male suffrage reforms
newly enfranchised about half of all adult men, that is about a quarter of the
adult population, the estimate using a single male dummy in Model (3) can be
compared to the estimates presented above. Indeed, a single male dummy yields a
highly comparable estimate of 7 per cent, with an increase from about 1 per cent
to 8.2 per cent in the lagged specification.
The effect of a female dummy in Model 3 (Tables 2 and 3) is comparatively
small and not significant in any regression. This should not be surprising, since,
as hypothesized, the effect of female suffrage should depend on Catholicism and
the female labour force. In testing the second hypothesis, I first interact female
suffrage with Catholicism and the female labour force separately. Socialists should
always do better if the proportion of women in the workforce is at its highest point.
On the other hand, regardless of the female labour force, Socialists should always
do better in Protestant countries. The last two columns in Tables 2 and 3 show
the interaction of the female dummy with the percentage of Catholics (Model 4)
and the female labour force (Model 5). The results for the marginal effects are
shown in Figure 3.
Model (4) (Tables 2 and 3) shows that female suffrage increases Socialist sup-
port in predominantly Protestant countries and reduces the Socialist share in pre-
dominantly Catholic countries. Specifically, Model (4) shows that, after controlling
for all covariates, when the percentage of Catholics is at 0, the mean Socialist vote
share after the enfranchisement is 4.9 per cent higher than the mean Socialist vote
share before the enfranchisement. For every additional percentage of Catholics,
the difference between Protestant and Catholic countries is reduced by 0.091 per
cent, giving a difference of about 0.3 per cent if the share of Catholics is 50 per cent
and about -4.2 per cent if the share of Catholics is 100 per cent. The interaction
effect is highly significant. The lagged specifications in Table 3 return significant
and comparable estimates of the long run effects.
Model (5) (Tables 2 and 3) shows that the effect of female suffrage on Socialist
parties also depends on the female labour force. If the percentage of women in the
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Figure 3: The Effects of Female Suffrage Conditional on Catholicism
and Female Labour Force
Notes: The marginal effects are based on Models (4–5) as displayed in Table 2.
workforce is as high as 40 per cent, which is the highest average female labour force
in the sample, the Socialists gain about 4.2 per cent. If, however, the female labour
force is as low as 15 per cent, which is the lowest country average in the sample,
the Socialists lose about 2 per cent. Although the interaction effect in the lagged
specification displayed in Table 3 is not statistically significant at conventional
levels, the estimates of the long run effects are very comparable to the estimates
in Table 2.
The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 thus show that the effect of female
suffrage is independently conditional on both Catholicism and the female labour
force. In Table 4 I estimate the effect of the female labour force separately in
Catholic and Protestant countries.8 Models (1) and (2) in Table 4 show estimates
of the effect of female suffrage on the support for Socialists in the Catholic and
Protestant sub-samples respectively. The first column (Model 1) fits the model in
all countries which are more than 90 per cent Catholic (Austria, Belgium, France,
Italy, Ireland, Spain). The second column (Model 2) includes countries which lack
a substantial Catholic minority (Denmark, Greece, Norway, Sweden, UK) or have
a substantial Catholic minority (Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands,
8Splitting the sample by religion dummy is equivalent to interacting all variables in the model
with Catholicism.
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Switzerland). The results for the marginal effects are shown in Figure 4.
Table 4: The Effect of the Female Labour Force by Catholicism and
the Effect of Suffrage on Christian Democratic Votes, 1880-1975
Dependent Var.: Socialist (%) Christian Dem. (%)
Sample Catholic Catholic All All All
>90% < 90%
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
M. suff. (dum.) 7.607*** 5.664*** 3.572*** 3.568*** 3.547***
(1.615) (0.932) (0.652) (0.654) (0.65)
F. suff. (dum.) -7.199* -5.795* 1.014** -0.347 1.844
(3.838) (3.076) (0.493) (0.444) (1.861)
Catholics (%) 0.479* -0.81*** 0.198 0.232* 0.192
(0.276) (0.189) (0.136) (0.131) (0.137)
F. labour (%) 0.049 -0.576*** 0.04 0.059 0.058
(0.2) (0.15) (0.098) (0.096) (0.107)
F. suff.*Cath. 0.031**
(0.013)
F. suff.*F. lab. 0.196* 0.333*** -0.03
(0.117) (0.111) (0.074)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Five years FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 446 855 1301 1301 1301
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in
brackets; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agri-
cultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity, Com-
munist Vote Share (%), Christian Democratic Vote Share (%) in Models (1–2) and
Socialist Vote Share (%) in Models 3–5; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant
at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
The results provide further support for the second hypothesis. In both sub-
samples the main and interaction effects have the same sign, showing that with an
increasing number of women in the workforce the support for Socialists increases.
Regardless of Catholicism, Socialists always do better when the female labour force
is large. Further, the results show that the effect of the female labour force can only
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Figure 4: The Effects of Female Suffrage Conditional on Female
Labour Force by Catholicism
Notes: The marginal effects are based on Models (1–2) as displayed in Table 4.
lessen the impact of Catholicism on Socialist support. In Protestant countries, the
Socialist gains can be highest where the female labour force is greatest. Indeed,
while all Protestant countries saw an increase in Socialist support after female
suffrage, just an increase of 3 per cent of women in the workforce adds 1 per cent
more votes to the Socialists after suffrage (Model 2 in Table 4). Although Socialist
support decreases in Catholic countries after female suffrage, their losses can be
lessened by a large female labour force (see Figure 4). Indeed, where the average
female labour force is at its greatest (40 per cent), the Socialists do not lose any
votes (Model 1 in Table 4). As the proportion of women in the workforce decreases,
the Socialists in Catholic countries start losing support after female suffrage.
The above results jointly provide evidence for the effects of female suffrage
on Socialist support. However, did the Socialists in Catholic countries lose to the
Christian Democrats? Models (3-4) in Table 4 provide evidence that the Christian
Democrats were the main beneficiaries of female suffrage in Catholic countries. On
average, female suffrage increased the support for Christian Democrats by about
1 per cent (Model 3). In Catholic countries, however, the Christian Democrats
increased their support after suffrage by as much as 2.8 per cent (Model 4). This is
comparable to the estimate of 4.2 per cent losses to Socialists in Catholic countries.
Finally, although the interaction effect of the female labour force for Christian
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Democratic parties is not statistically significant, the estimates suggest that a
large female labour force mitigates Christian Democratic losses (Model 5).
Table 5: Robustness Analyses and Alternative Specifications
Dependent Var.: Socialist Vote Share
Sample 1880–1938 1880–1938 & Small Excl. Swe & Den
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
M. suff. (cont.) 0.117*** 0.111*** 0.148***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.033)
M. suff. (dum.) 6.328*** 6.9***
(0.927) (0.932)
F. suff. (dum.) 1.818** 2.604** 2.282** 4.73*** -6.184**
(0.846) (1.105) (1.12) (1.162) (2.385)
Catholics (%) -1.125*** -1.387*** -1.351*** -0.168 -0.055
(0.267) (0.329) (0.331) (0.146) (0.144)
F. lab. (%) -0.221 -0.422 -0.493 -0.226* -0.302**





F. suff.*F. lab. 0.246***
(0.084)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Five years FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 764 414 414 1116 1117
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in
brackets; Small refers to 8 countries which adopted universal suffrage after the
establishment of Socialist parties and after 1880; Controls include PR (dummy),
Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agricultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers
(%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity, Communist Vote Share (%), Christian Democratic
Vote Share (%), Socialist Vote Share (%); *** significant at 1% level; ** significant
at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Table 5 provides a number of alternative specifications and robustness checks.
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First, Models (12) in Table 5 document that the main results are robust to shorter
and smaller panels. Model (1) shows that the effects of male suffrage remain intact
when the panel covers only the period 1880-1938, that is when all male reforms
have taken place. Model (2) shows that these results persist also after excluding
countries that adopted male suffrage prior to the establishment of Socialist parties.
Second, Model (3) in Table 5 shows that the effect of male suffrage does not
depend on Catholicism. Socialists benefited from male suffrage in both Catholic
and Protestant countries. Third, Models (4-5) in Table 5 show that the results
remain intact when Sweden and Denmark are excluded from the sample.9
The online appendix presents three additional tables. Appendix Table 1 shows
that the main result remains highly comparable once ‘left parties’ (Communist and
Socialist) are considered as a single dependent variable. Appendix Table 2 shows
that the main result remains intact for parliamentary representation of Socialists
(seat shares). Finally, since including controls which can be alternative dependent
variables may cause post-estimation bias, Appendix Table 3 drops party controls
and shows that, substantively, the main result remains intact.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
Although it has been well documented that franchise extension increases the size
of the government, the political mechanism that links franchise reforms and re-
distribution in Western Europe has been much debated. While the economic
theory implies no partisan effect, some studies link the strength of left parties
to the size of the welfare state provision and the size of the working-class elec-
torate. Moreover, ample anecdotal evidence suggests that the newly enfranchised
men supported the Socialists and that the newly enfranchised women supported
the Christian Democrats in Catholic countries. Yet previous research provided
limited systematic evidence that male suffrage indeed increases support for left
parties. The enfranchisement of women, in turn, was generally thought to have no
effect on partisan support, despite the fact that women were frequently assumed to
hold distinctive redistributive preferences. Contrary to the prediction of economic
9Both Sweden and Denmark enfranchised a small proportion of men (on public relief) together
with women. If these men voted for the Socialists, the positive effect of female suffrage in
Protestant countries on Socialist support could be overestimated.
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models, this study has shown that both male and female suffrage are correlated
with long-term electoral gains of political parties with a redistributive agenda. The
newly enfranchised men voted for the Socialists, whereas the newly enfranchised
women voted for either Socialists or Christian Democrats, depending on the level
of Catholicism and the size of the female labour force.
I argued that the family-friendly and Catholic policies of Christian Democratic
parties in Catholic countries appealed to both the redistributive and socially con-
servative policies of the newly enfranchised women. However, even in Catholic
countries, whenever a large proportion of women entered the paid workforce the
Christian Democratic appeal to women was lessened, as the Christian Democrats
now had to compete with the Socialist parties for women’s votes. In the absence of
family-friendly policies and Christian Democratic parties in predominantly Protes-
tant countries, women had to enter the paid workforce. Once employed, they
developed a strong reliance on the Socialist welfare system which provided them
with state-funded relief from their traditional caregiving responsibilities. The key
finding of this study provides an additional piece of evidence that the rise of the
welfare state after suffrage reforms was mediated by the strength of political parties
with a redistributive agenda. Future research should further examine the effects
of suffrage within individual countries and outside the Western context.
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5 Summary Findings and Future Agendas
In this dissertation research, I took a first pass at examining women’s historical
voting behaviour. Such research has been limited, mostly owing to the lack of
reliable large-scale survey data prior to the 1950s. Analyzing aggregate electoral
results, I re-examined some of the conventional wisdoms in the literature, that are
mostly supported with anecdotal evidence or by limited polling data from locations
where authorities tallied votes separately for women and men.
To the degree that women had different political preferences than men, bring-
ing them into the electorate should have influenced partisan distribution in the
legislatures. In this research I show that women’s suffrage indeed affected parti-
san constellations in the national bodies. The key finding of this research is that
women supported parties with redistributive agendas both in the long run and at
the time of suffrage. Such findings shed light on several competing theses in the
literature.
First, contrary to the so frequent claims that women’s voting behaviour did
not differ much from that of their husbands, I provide evidence that women’s
votes affected power constellations between parties in national legislative bodies.
In many ways, politicians’ fears and hopes that, once enfranchised, women would
vote differently from men have materialized.
Second, my research reveals limitations of the economic literature which im-
plies that women’s votes were not responsible for the vast redistributive effects of
women’s suffrage. Contrary to the economic literature, my research shows that
while all parties may have strategically sought votes of the newly enfranchised
women, not all parties did so equally well. Instead, parties with redistributive
agendas likely mediated the redistributive effects of women’s suffrage.
Third – and most importantly – there has long been consensus in political
science that a ‘traditional’ gender voting gap existed prior to the 1960s, but that
as the second wave of feminism emerged so too did the ‘modern’ gender voting gap,
where women vote more liberally than men. In contrast, I note that particularly
at the time of suffrage in most countries – that is long before the second wave of
feminism – women’s unequal role in the household and their economic vulnerability
have driven them to prefer parties with redistributive as well as suffrage agendas.
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Substantively, my research does not seek to contradict the notion that women
endorsed socially conservative preferences. My research, however, directly contra-
dicts the notion that women voted on such preferences for conservative parties
at the time of the first feminist wave. Moreover, despite the reactionary post-
war years, parties with redistributive agendas benefitted from womens suffrage,
particularly when women’s labour force was large.
Going forward, I plan to build upon this research in several ways. First, I plan
to examine further political outcomes, such as political competition of turnout.
Second, and more importantly, I aim to develop the third paper into a book length
manuscript including more Western as well as non-Western countries. It is only
in the comparative perspective that I can convincingly adjudicate between the
competing theses which stipulate women’s voting behaviour. Moreover, at this
stage, women’s voting behaviour at the time of suffrage in the vast amount of
cases outside the West remains largely neglected in the literature.
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A.1 Appendix for Chapter 1: Introduction
Appendix Figure 1: Women disenfranchised for fears of their prohi-
bitionist preferences.
Caption: P.C. Hardy: ‘Tut, tut, lady, I can’t let you open the door New Year’s
Day, because I’d have to shut this door and my friends in the trade wouldn’t like
it.’
Source: Canada, The Evening Standard, 1898.
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Appendix Figure 2: Women being excluded from the electorate as
‘Mothers’.
Caption: ‘Everybody votes but mother.’
Source: Canada, Grain Growers Guide, 1914
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Appendix Figure 3: Women as lobbyists for progressive reforms, in-
cluding suffrage.
Caption: ‘A woman’s work is never done.’
Source: U.S., The New York Telegram, 1918
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Appendix Figure 4: Progressive Party offering women suffrage in
exchange for their progressive votes.
Caption: ‘The unanswerable argument for suffrage.’
Source: U.S., NAWSA, 1912
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Appendix Figure 5: U.K. Labour Party seeking women’s votes.
Source: U.K., Labour Party campaign poster, 1929
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Appendix Figure 6: Pamphlet of the National Union in the U.K.
that seeks to ’ameliorate economic condition of women’.
Source: U.K., NUWS Pamphlet, 1911
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A.2 Appendix for Chapter 2: Votes for and by Women:
How Did Women Vote after the Nineteenth Amend-
ment?
Appendix Figure 1: Plotting Change in Democratic Support (1920-
1918) on the Female Vote by 90th Percentile Black
Notes: The grey dots and fitted line correspond to white counties. The black dots
and fitted line represents trends in the Black Belt.
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Appendix Table 1: Correlates of Female Vote 1920-1918
Model (1) (2)
ln(population density) 0.934*** 0.934***
(0.09) (0.09)
Adult black (%) -0.017 -0.017
(0.01) (0.011)
Adult illiterate (%) 0.026 0.026
(0.018) (0.018)
Methodists (%) 0.111*** 0.111***
(0.013) (0.013)
Baptists (%) 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.011) (0.011)
Roman Catholics (%) 0.023*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005)
Value of all crops (millions) 0.168*** 0.169***
(0.045) (0.045)
Total manufacturing output (millions) 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.006) (0.006)
Republican Vote Share 1918 0.007*
(0.004)
Democratic Vote Share 1918 -0.006
(0.004)
District fixed effects Yes Yes




Appendix Table 2: Alternative Cut-Off Points
Cut-off point 95th percentile 80th percentile 70th percentile 60th percentile
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
a) Rep. votes 1920-1918
Female vote (%) -0.305 0.298** -0.305 0.459*** 0.122 0.395*** 0.179 0.411**
(0.417) (0.141) (0.292) (0.145) (0.26) (0.149) (0.236) (0.159)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
b) Dem. votes 1920-1918
Female vote (%) 0.282 -0.407*** 0.402 -0.568*** -0.145 -0.542*** -0.171 -0.676***
(0.419) (0.153) (0.313) (0.157) (0.274) (0.166) (0.245) (0.195)
District FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (1919) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls (1919-1914) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample Black White Black White Black White Black White
Obs. 109 1888 428 1569 638 1359 855 1142
Notes: Controls for 1919 levels include: ln (population density); % Adult black; % Adult illiterate; % Roman
Catholics; % Baptists; % Methodists; Value of all crops; Total manufacturing output; Differenced controls over
1919-1914 include all as above but % Total black population and % Adult male illiterate; Robust standard errors in
parentheses; All models include a constant; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Appendix Table 3: Including Counties with Boundary Changes
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
a) Rep. votes 1920-1918
Female vote (%) 1.063*** 1.114*** 0.146 0.272** -0.742*** -0.584 -0.297 -0.476 1.294*** 1.478*** 0.238* 0.404***
(0.153) (0.222) (0.123) (0.127) (0.27) (0.395) (0.3) (0.32) (0.171) (0.24) (0.131) (0.144)
Model (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
b) Dem. votes 1920-1918
Female vote (%) -0.158 -1.004*** -0.278** -0.364*** 1.034*** 0.312 0.142 0.309 -0.33* -1.365 -0.398*** -0.502***
(0.162) (0.242) (0.134) (0.137) (0.357) (0.426) (0.292) (0.32) (0.18) (0.261) (0.142) (0.155)
District FEs x x Yes Yes x x Yes Yes x x Yes Yes
Controls (1919) x Yes Yes Yes x Yes Yes Yes x Yes Yes Yes
Controls (1919-1914) x Yes x Yes x Yes x Yes x Yes x Yes
Sample All All All All Black Black Black Black White White White White
Obs. 2275 2102 2039 2023 228 218 219 218 2047 1884 1820 1805
Notes: Controls for 1919 levels include: ln(population density); % Adult black; % Adult illiterate; % Roman Catholics; % Baptists; % Methodists; Value of all crops;
Total manufacturing output; Differenced controls over 1919-1914 include all as above but % Total black population and % Adult male illiterate; Robust standard errors
in parentheses; All models include a constant; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Appendix Table 4: Excluding Three States Which Extended Suffrage in 1918
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
a) Rep. votes 1920-1918
Female vote (%) 1.258*** 1.3*** 0.152 0.255* -0.737** -0.603 -0.329 -0.505 1.544*** 1.736*** 0.259* 0.396**
(0.173) (0.236) (0.134) (0.136) (0.271) (0.408) (0.307) (0.324) (0.196) (0.255) (0.141) (0.154)
Model (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24)
b) Dem. votes 1920-1918
Female vote (%) -0.271 -1.13*** -0.303** -0.359** 1.028*** 0.332 0.159 0.323 -0.474** -1.544*** -0.445*** -0.514***
(0.18) (0.262) (0.144) (0.147) (0.359) (0.438) (0.299) (0.325) (0.202) (0.284) (0.152) (0.167)
District FEs x x Yes Yes x x Yes Yes x x Yes Yes
Controls (1919) x Yes Yes Yes x Yes Yes Yes x Yes Yes Yes
Controls (1919-1914) x Yes x Yes x Yes x Yes x Yes x Yes
Sample All All All All Black Black Black Black White White White White
Obs. 2022 1884 1819 1808 224 214 215 214 1798 1670 1604 1594
Notes: Controls for 1919 levels include: ln(population density); % Adult black; % Adult illiterate; % Roman Catholics; % Baptists; % Methodists; Value of all crops;
Total manufacturing output; Differenced controls over 1919-1914 include all as above but % Total black population and % Adult male illiterate; Robust standard errors
in parentheses; All models include a constant; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%
A.3 Appendix for Chapter 3: After the Vote: Program-
matic Preferences and Women’s Loyalty
Appendix Material 1: Description of Four Exclusion Criteria.
The first inclusion criterion, of a national level reform to women’s voting rights,
can be measured in several ways. In many countries such as Finland and New
Zealand all women above a certain age became eligible to vote in national elections
at the same time. Yet in others, women from different social groups or regions
would have received voting rights reform in separate extensions. For example,
South Africa and Kenya extended votes to white women before women of color,
and states in the United States, and Cantons in Switzerland, extended votes to
women within their borders while women in other subnational units were excluded
from the right for longer. Finally, some countries extended voting rights to women
on a class basis. For example, in 1918 the U.K. allowed propertied women of
certain ages to vote before universal suffrage in 1929. For consistency and clarity,
we define our key independent variable, national level women’s enfranchisement,
as a piece of national legislation that guarantees voting rights to the vast majority
of women in a given country.
The second criterion for case selection is that the country in question had to be
a democracy prior to and after the extension of voting rights to women, and must
have a relatively stable party system across the relevant time period. In principle
the application of the democracy requirement is obvious, and eliminates a large
number of cases off the bat like Angola, which extended universal suffrage in 1992
at the end of the civil war. In some instances, though, it requires clarification.
For example, Cambodia extended manhood suffrage in 1946, prior to its official
independence from France in 1953. In 1955, the right to vote was extended to
Cambodian women, but the election in that year was not competitive and resulted
in the same party holding control for 15 years (Rieger et al. 2001). Along with
lacking turnover, a key component of the minimalist conception of democracy,
it would be difficult to make a meaningful assessment of the reform’s effects in
uncompetitive elections.
The final aspect of the second inclusion criterion is that the democratic country
in question needed a relatively stable party system before and after the reform
was enacted. This is an empirical requirement insofar as it would be impossible to
estimate a change in partisan support if the same parties were not extant before
and after the reform. This criterion excludes countries like Costa Rica, which
had manhood suffrage under the secret ballot in 1925, and extended the vote to
women in 1949, one year after a coup that not only deposed the government, but
also saw a complete transformation in the party makeup in 1949 and again in 1953
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(Nohlen 2005: 151ff.). It also excludes New Zealand, which although it extended
the suffrage in 1893 in an arguably less volatile environment than Costa Rica,
nevertheless only began to solidify the party groups in that same year.
The third criterion by which we exclude cases from our sample occurs when
women’s enfranchisement was extended in a year in which other major electoral
reforms were enacted, such as changes to the male franchise laws or significant
chances in boundaries of local units. This excludes from study the United King-
dom’s Fourth Reform Act in 1918, which, while it granted the vote to a large
share of British women (over 35 whose husbands were taxpayers), also brought
a large share of men who were not heads of households into the electorate. The
1928 reform in the U.K., however, which removed the age bar for women without
changing constituency boundaries, is amenable to study.
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Appendix Table 1: Original Sample Selection of 152 countries
Country Name ccode Women’s Suffrage Sample? Criterion
Afghanistan AFG 1963 N 2
Algeria DZA 1962 N 2
Angola AGO 1975 [1992] N 2, 3
Argentina ARG [1913 (f)] 1947 Y/M 4
Armenia ARM 1919 N 2
Australia AUS [1902 (r)] 1962 Y
Austria AUT 1918 N 2,3
Azerbaijan AZE 1918 N
Bahrain BHR 1973 N 3
Bangladesh BGD 1972 N 4
Belgium BEL [1919 (o)] 1948 Y
Belize BLZ 1945 (a,r,p); 1954 N
Benin BEN 1960 N 2,3
Bhutan BTN 1953 N 2
Bolivia BOL 1952 N 3
Botswana BWA 1965 N
Brazil BRA 1932 N 3
Brunei BRN 1959 N 2
Burkina Faso BFA 1960 N
Burundi BDI 1961 N
Cambodia KHM 1955 N 2
Cameroon CMR 1956 N
Canada CAN [1916 (f)] 1917# 1920 (r) Y/M
Cape Verde CPV 1975 N
Central African Rep. CAF 1986 N
Chad TCD 1960 N
Chile CHL 1949 Y
China CHN 1949 N 2
Comoros COM 1960 N
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1960 N
Congo, Rep. COG 1960 N
Cook Islands CIL 1893 N 2
Costa Rica CRI 1949 N 2
Cote d’Ivoire CIV 1960 N
Denmark DNK [1908 (l)] 1918 N 3
Djibouti DJI 1977 N 3
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Country Name ccode Women’s Suffrage Sample? Criterion
Dominican Republic DOM 1942 N 2
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY 1956 N 2
El Salvador SLV 1950 N 2
Eritrea ERI 1955 N
Ethiopia ETH 1955 N 2,3
Fiji FJO 1963 N 3
Finland FIN 1906 N 3
France FRA 1944 N 2
Gabon GAB 1956 N 2
Gambia, The GMB 1960 N 2
Georgia GEO 1918 N
Germany DEU 1918 M 3
Ghana GHA 1957 N 2, 3
Greece GRC 1952 Y
Grenada GRD 1951 N 2
Guatemala GTM 1945 (e) N 2
Guinea GIN 1960, 1956 N 2
Guinea- Bissau GNB N 2
Guinea, Equatorial GIN 1963 N 2
Guyana GUY 1953 N 2
Haiti HTI 1957 N 2,3
Honduras HND 1954; 1957-1955 N 2
Iceland ISL [1911/1914] 1915(a) 1919 N 3
India IND 1949 Y/M
Indonesia IDN 1945 N 3
Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN [1952 (m)] 1963 M 4
Iraq IRQ 1967 N 2, 3
Ireland IRL 1922 N 2?
Israel ISR [1920 (r)] 1948 N 2
Italy ITA 1946 N 2
Jamaica JAM 1953 N 3
Japan JPN 1945 N 2
Jordan JOR 1974 N 2
Kazakhstan KAZ 1924 N 2
Kenya KEN 1963 N 2
Kiribati KIR 1967 N 2
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Country Name ccode Women’s Suffrage Sample? Criterion
Korea, North PRK 1948 N 2
Korea, Republic of KOR 1948 N 2
Kuwait KWT 2005 Y/M
Kyrgyz Republic KGZ 1918 N 2
Lao PDR LAO 1958 M 2
Lebanon LBN [1952 (e)] 1957 M: 1957
Lesotho LSO 1965 N 2
Liberia LBR 1946 M 3
Libya LBY 1963 M 2
Luxembourg LUX 1919 N 3
Madagascar MDG 1956 N 2
Malawi MWI 1964 N 3
Malaysia MYS 1957 N 3
Mali MLI 1956 N 2,3
Malta MLT 1947 N 3
Marshall Islands MHL N 2
Mauritania MRT 1961 N 2
Mauritius MUS 1959 N 2
Mexico MEX 1953 Y
Micronesia FSM M 2
Mongolia MNG 1924 N 2
Morocco MAR 1959 N 2
Mozambique MOZ 1975 N 2
Myanmar MMR 1948 N 2
Namibia NAM 1989 N 2
Nauru 1968 N 2
Nepal NPL 1951 N 2
Netherlands NLD 1919 Y
New Zealand NZL 1893 N 2
Nicaragua NIC 1950, 1955 N 2,3
Niger NER 1960 N 2
Nigeria NGA [1960 (r)] 1977 M: 1977
Norway NOR [1907 (p)] 1913 Y
Oman OMN N 2
Pakistan PAK 1956 N 2
Palau PLW N 2
Panama PAN 1945 N 2
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Papa New Guinea PNG 1964 N 2
Philippines PHL 1938 N 3
Portugal PRT [1931(e)] 1976, 1974 N 2
Puerto Rico PRI [1929 (l)] 1936 Y
Qatar QAT N
Rwanda RWA 1961 N 2
Samoa WSM 1990 M
Sao Tome and Principe STP 1975 N 2
Saudi Arabia SAU N 2
Senegal SEN 1960 N 2
Seychelles SYC 1976 N 2
Sierra Leone SLE 1961 N 2
Singapore SGP [1947?] 1965 M
Solomon Islands SLB N 2
Somalia SOM 1961 M
South Africa ZAF [1930 (r)] 1994 N 2,3
Spain ESP 1931(t), 1976 M 3
Sri Lanka LKA [1931 ?] N 3
Sudan SDN 1964 M
Swaziland SWZ 1967 N 2
Sweden SWE 1919 M 3
Switzerland CHE [1959 (f)] 1971 Y
Syrian Arab Republic SYR 1949 Y
Taiwan TAW 1947 N 2
Tajikistan TJK 1924 N
Tanzania TZA 1961 N 2
Thailand THA 1932 N 2
Togo TGO 1958 N 2
Tonga TON 1960 M 4,3
Trinidad and Tobago TTO [1924 (a)] 1946 Y 4
Tunisia TUN 1959 N 2
Turkey TUR 1930 Y
Turkmenistan TKM 1924 N 3?
Tuvalu 1967 N 2
Uganda UGA 1962 M 2
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United Arab Emirates ARE N 2
United Kingdom GBR [1918 (a,p)] 1928 Y: 1928
United States of America USA [1893 (f)] 1920 Y
Uzbekistan UZB 1938 N 2
Vanuatu VUT 1975 N 2
Vietnam VNM 1946 N 2
Yemen, Rep. YEM 1970 M 2
Zambia ZMB N 2
Zimbabwe ZWE 1980 M
Notes: ccode is the World Development Indicators’ three-letter country code. The
following notes apply: (a) indicates an age restriction different from men; (e) educa-
tional restriction; (p) indicates continued property or tax requirements; (f) indicates
a limited national suffrage in some federal states; (m) municipal level; (r) indicates
continued racial exclusion; (t) lost after regime transition; Aˆge 29; # Canadian
women with family members in armed services could vote federally in 1917. Cri-
teria for inclusion: (1) reform administered with a single piece of legislation at the
national level; (2) country a democracy before and after reform with relatively sta-
ble party system; (3) women’s enfranchisement not concurrent with other major
electoral reform; (4) availability of data for disaggregated electoral units.
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A.4 Appendix for Chapter 4: Universal Suffrage and the
Electoral Support for Parties with Redistributive Agen-
das: Evidence from Sixteen Countries
Appendix Table 1: The Effect of Suffrage on Socialist and Commu-
nist Vote Shares in Sixteen Countries, 1880–1975
Dependent Var.: Socialist and Communist Vote Share
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enfr. pop. (%) 0.102***
(0.016)
M. suff. (cont.) 0.127***
(0.016)
M. suff. (dum.) 6.683*** 6.404*** 6.98***
(0.894) (0.885) (0.895)
F. suff. (dum.) 0.872 1.052 4.475*** -7.583***
(0.745) (0.742) (1.016) (2.503)
Catholics (%) -0.435*** -0.498*** -0.494*** -0.593*** -0.42***
(0.146) (0.144) (0.143) (0.146) (0.144)
F. lab. (%) -0.149 -0.019 -0.111 -0.152 -0.288**
(0.122) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.131)
F. suff.*Cath. -0.071***
(0.018)
F. suff.*F. lab. 0.317***
(0.086)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Five years FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in
brackets; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agri-
cultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity, Chris-
tian Democratic Vote Share (%); *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5%
level; * significant at 10% level.
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Appendix Table 2: The Effect of Suffrage on Socialist Seat Shares
in Sixteen Countries, 1880–1975.
Dependent Var.: Socialist Seat Share
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enfr. pop. (%) 0.081***
(0.019)
M. suff. (cont.) 0.113***
(0.017)
M. suff. (dum.) 6.935*** 6.425*** 7.197***
(1.153) (1.119) (1.16)
F. suff. (dum.) 1.768* 1.895* 6.748*** -5.066*
(0.979) (0.967) (1.432) (2.984)
Catholics (%) 0.129 0.111 0.134 0.026 0.181
(0.195) (0.192) (0.191) (0.181) (0.197)
F. lab. (%) -0.25* -0.156 -0.242 -0.31** -0.383**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.145) (0.159)
F. suff.*Cath. -0.117***
(0.02)
F. suff.*F. lab. 0.256**
(0.101)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Five years FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in
brackets; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agri-
cultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity, Chris-
tian Democratic Vote Share (%); Communist Vote Share (%); *** significant at
1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
153
Appendix Table 3: The Effect of Suffrage on Socialist Vote Shares
in Sixteen Countries, Without Party Controls, 1880–1975.
Dependent Var.: Socialist Vote Share
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enfr. pop. (%) 0.089***
(0.015)
M. suff. (cont.) 0.108***
(0.015)
M. suff. (dum.) 6.958*** 6.742*** 7.125***
(0.896) (0.885) (0.893)
Fem. suff. (dum.) 0.807 0.967 5.1*** -4.748**
(0.713) (0.699) (0.948) (2.314)
Catholics (%) 0.173 0.127 0.133 0.044 0.174
(0.165) (0.16) (0.161) (0.153) (0.164)
F. lab. (%) -0.252* -0.146 -0.221* -0.273** -0.339**
(0.129) (0.128) (0.128) (0.125) (0.136)
F. suff.*Cath. -0.097***
(0.017)
F. suff.*F. lab. 0.209**
(0.081)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Five years FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1301 1301 1301 1301 1301
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors with Prais-Winsten transformation in
brackets; Controls include PR (dummy), Turnout (%), Urbanization (%), Agri-
cultural Workers (%), Industrial Workers (%), Old (%), ln(GDP), Polity; ***
significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
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